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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of outward cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) by emerging-market multinationals, using China as the focus of investigation. In 1999, 
the Chinese government initiated the ‘Going global’ policy to promote Chinese investments 
abroad. The intended rationale behind the policy was to support the seeking of strategic assets 
(e.g., technology, brand, and management expertise, etc.) located abroad and to gain global 
knowledge and experience—all in order to compete more effectively against foreign rivals in 
both domestic and global markets, and to ultimately enhance the development and welfare of 
China. Accordingly, this study examines whether the Chinese indigenous firms generally 
experience enhanced productivity in their domestic operations in the years subsequent to the 
cross-border M&A activities, the role of government involved, and the influence of the 
transitioning corporate governance in domestic productivity upgrading via cross-border M&As. 
The first essay addresses the important role played by the Chinese government when 
Chinese acquirers purchase foreign targets. In particular, I submit that state-ownership is a key 
factor in explaining the high acquisition premiums generally paid by Chinese firms engaging in 
outward cross-border merger activities. Moreover, state-owned MNEs pay even higher 
acquisition premiums when they act as parents and employ a privately-owned subsidiary to 
complete the cross-border M&A. 
The second essay investigates whether Chinese acquirers upgrade their home productivity 
via cross-border M&A activities. Building on the literature of asset exploration, absorptive 
capacity, and knowledge transfer within multinational firms, I posit that the strategic assets that 
Chinese acquirers obtain from foreign targets enable them to learn and increase post-M&A 
productivity in their home operations. Empirical results confirm that on average Chinese 
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acquirers are able to enhance domestic productivity subsequent to cross-border M&A activities. 
This enhanced productivity stems from the acquisition of developed-nation targets rather than 
developing-nation targets. Furthermore, cross-border M&As represent a superior vehicle to 
engage in learning as compared to international alliances. 
The third essay examines the firm-level heterogeneity in corporate governance which is 
conducive to firms being able to learn from their cross-border activities. Empirical findings 
suggest that government ownership decreases the effect of cross-border M&As on subsequent 
domestic productivity as compared to non-government ownership, which indicates that state-
owned enterprises are indeed less efficient in terms of learning. Top management team equity 
ownership enhances acquirer’s domestic productivity via cross-border M&A activities, whereas 
pay does not. It implies that stock rewards are more efficient than cash rewards in incentivizing 
managers to align their interests with the firm and thus alleviating the agency problem.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly pursued by the emerging-market nations 
(Narula & Dunning, 2000). Especially in China and India, cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) have become the preferred vehicle of choice for outward FDI in the triad region (U.S., 
Western Europe, Japan/Australia) (Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 2009). Unlike in developed 
nations, government support has been an important factor in emerging-market MNEs’ 
internationalization. Since the ‘Go Global’ policy in 1999, the Chinese government has actively 
encouraged and supported the internationalization of Chinese firms. Assistance in the form of 
access to inexpensive financing, research and development, and policy support have been 
instrumental in easing the costs for Chinese firms engaging in outward cross-border M&A 
activities. In India, the supports from the state and its public policies have been crucial for the 
rise of Indian MNEs (Taylor & Nölke, 2010). Contrary to traditional developed-nation MNEs 
who often conduct cross-border M&As in order to establish market power, create synergies, and 
obtain instant growth, one important intent behind emerging-market MNEs’ cross-border M&A 
activities is that these firms are learning via the strategic assets (e.g., technology, brand, and 
management expertise, etc.) acquired from overseas to gain global knowledge and experience—
thereby they can compete more effectively against foreign rivals in both domestic and global 
markets.  
Emerging-market outward FDI becomes increasingly important as under the current 
world economic conditions, much of the recovery of world FDI has been driven by investments 
from emerging-markets, in contrast to the bigger decline of FDI from developed countries 
(UNCTAD, 2011). Cross-border M&As by emerging-market MNEs create an opportunity for us 
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to enrich the existing literature on firms’ internationalization as many of emerging-market MNEs’ 
activities are divergent from the traditional models based on evidence from developed-nation 
MNEs. Therefore, it becomes necessary to deepen our understanding towards the phenomenon of 
outward M&As by emerging-market MNEs. Yet, research in this topic is still in its early stage. 
Current research in this area is narrowly confined to several subjects such as the preconditions 
(e.g., Luo & Tung, 2007), the motivations (e.g., Boateng, Qian, & Tianle, 2008; Buckley et al. 
2007; Luo & Tung, 2007) and the determinants (e.g., Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Buckley et al. 2007; 
Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2010; Gubbi et al. 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007). A relatively large body of 
research focuses on the impact of M&A announcement on acquirer’s value creation using event-
study method (e.g., Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Boateng, Qian, & Tianle, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, & 
Tesar, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, et.al, 2008; Gubbi et al. 2010). In addition, existing studies on 
emerging-market cross-border M&As are largely theoretical, whereas limited empirical studies 
have been done and results are mixed. Micro-level studies are rare on emerging-market MNEs’ 
corporate governance, human resource management, organizational structure, innovation and 
R&D, and its evolving dynamics. Therefore, existing theories are very much in need of 
refinement and extension to incorporate the various aspects of emerging-market firms’ outward 
FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012).  
China provides an ideal setting to study the phenomenon of outward cross-border M&As 
by emerging-market MNEs. In the past two decades, Chinese government has not only been a 
supporter for China’s outward M&A activities, but also an active investor via its control of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China has benefited tremendously from inward FDI. Global 
players cooperating with Chinese indigenous firms have transferred their technological and 
organizational skills, which enhances Chinese MNEs’ capabilities towards being able to 
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assimilate the knowledge acquired from overseas. However, as China is still transitioning from 
the government-central-planning economy to the market-oriented economy, the corporate 
governance practice inherited from the old central-planning system may hinder Chinese 
acquirers’ learning effectiveness via cross-border M&A activities. It is still unclear how cross-
border M&A activities by Chinese MNEs could affect Chinese economy and the global business 
subsequently. Using China as the focus of investigation, I seek to analyze the following 
questions in three essays: (1) What is the role of government in emerging-market MNEs’ cross-
border M&A activities? (2) Whether emerging-market MNEs are able to achieve learning and 
capability enhancement via cross-border M&A activities? (3) How does the transitioning 
corporate governance practice in emerging-market nations affect their learning effectiveness in 
the years subsequent to cross-border M&A activities? 
Essay 1 examines the important role played by the Chinese government when Chinese 
acquirers purchase foreign targets. One of the salient characteristics of emerging-market firms’ 
outbound M&As is the significant amount of state ownership involved. However, it is one 
particular attribute of acquiring firms that has been understudied by researchers. Thus I focus on 
how state ownership affects the acquisition premium paid by Chinese acquirers. In particular, I 
posit that state-ownership is a key factor in explaining the high acquisition premiums generally 
paid by Chinese firms engaging in outward cross-border merger activities.  
Essay 2 investigates whether Chinese acquirers generally experience enhanced 
productivity in their home market subsequent to cross-border M&A activities. Prior research has 
pointed out that high premium can be detrimental to acquiring firm’s value because it consumes 
from the expected acquisition synergies that must be achieved to sustain an acquired firm’s 
market value (Sirower, 1997). In light of the fact that Chinese SOEs pay very high premiums to 
 4 
 
foreign targets and most M&As fail (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Lubatkin, 1983; Morck, 
Schleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Pfeffer, 2007), it draws our attention to the question of “Why these 
Chinese SOEs are still consistently overpaying the foreign targets?”; “Are there any potential 
gains for the Chinese MNEs via outward cross-border M&A activities? Building on the 
perspective of asset exploration and exploitation (March, 1991), absorptive capacity theory 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and the knowledge of multinationals (Kogut & Zander, 1993), I 
submit that the strategic assets that Chinese acquirers obtain from foreign targets enable them to 
learn and increase post-M&A productivity in their home operations.  
Essay 3 addresses the impact of the transitioning corporate governance on Chinese 
acquirer’s learning via M&A activities. Corporate governance plays an important role in firm 
development especially in the context of emerging-markets where their economy is constantly in 
transition and characterized with unique complexity. Chinese firms have realized that corporate 
governance is the core for achieving the modern corporate enterprise system (Tenev, Zhang, & 
Brefort, 2002). The modern corporate enterprise reform since the 1990s has been focusing on the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and changing management systems. Accordingly, 
this essay examines how emerging-market acquirer’s state ownership, top management team 
(TMT), and chairman characteristics may possibly affect acquirer’s learning effectiveness via 
cross-border M&A activities.  
This dissertation contributes to the IB and Strategy literatures by showing that the recent 
emerging-markets’ internationalization is not always consistent with the traditional developed-
nation model. It displays distinct patterns such as the involvement of government ownership, the 
learning objective via cross-border M&As, and their transitioning corporate governance practice. 
As China is still transforming from the old government central-planning economy to the market-
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oriented economy, it inevitably inherits some characteristics from the old system while at the 
same time is embracing the new market economy system. This unique complexity provides an 
ideal context for scholars to uncover the emerging theories of firm internationalization. 
Therefore, existing research needs to be enriched to enhance our understanding towards 
emerging-market’s international activities and its impact on firm- or national-level economic 
development.  
Table 1.1 displays the main research questions addressed and the focal variables included 
in the three essays. 
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TABLES 
Table 1.1. Outline of the Three Essays 
 
Essay  Research Question  Dependent Variables  Independent Variables  
Essay 1 – Do State-Owned 
Enterprises Pay More? 
Evidence from Chinese 
Outward Cross-Border M&As  
Does state-ownership of the 
acquirer lead to higher 
acquisition premium paid to 
the foreign target?  
 
4-week acquisition 
premium  
 
1.The state ownership of the 
acquiring firm  
2.The state ownership of the 
parent firm  
Essay 2 – Emerging-Market 
Acquirers’ Productivity Gains 
via Cross-Border M&As: 
Evidence from Chinese 
Acquirers 
Do emerging-market acquirers 
upgrade their domestic 
productivity via cross-border 
M&A activities?  
 
Log of acquirer’s 
domestic sales 
1.Sum of acquirer’s cross-
border M&A activities 
2.Sum of acquirer’s 
international alliance 
activities 
3.Sum of acquirer’s cross-
border M&As of developed-
nation targets and Sum of 
acquirer’s cross-border 
M&As of developing-nation 
targets 
Essay 3 – How Corporate 
Governance Affects 
Emerging-Market Acquirers’ 
Productivity Gains via Cross-
Border M&As: Evidence from 
Chinese Acquirers  
How does emerging-market 
acquirer’s heterogeneity in 
corporate governance affect 
acquirer’s learning via cross-
border M&A activities?  
 
Log of acquirer’s 
domestic sales  
Interaction variables of Sum of 
acquirer’s cross-border M&A 
activities and acquirer’s: 
1.State ownership  
2.TMT equity ownership 
3.TMT pay 
4. Chairman education 
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CHAPTER 2 
ESSAY 1: DO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES PAY MORE? 
EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE OUTWARD CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Ownership structures play an important role in corporate governance, and this is particularly the 
case with emerging-market nations (LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). While 
nation-states previously supported their home multinational enterprises (MNEs) with favorable 
public policies and ample investment funds (Caves, 1982), nowadays governments often make a 
more direct effort to speed up the globalization process by taking an active role in cross-border 
investment via state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—especially in emerging-markets such as China 
(Heather & Wolff, 2012). For example, the Chinese state holds the majority of the shares in 
listed companies (Lau et al., 2007), and it is argued that Chinese SOEs have become increasingly 
important in global business activity since the onset of the ‘Going global’ policy in 1999 
(Ramamurti, 2009). Accordingly, SOEs represent one of the principal beneficiaries of enhanced 
government support for foreign direct investment (FDI), and seem to be moving beyond their 
traditional domain of domestic business by increasingly exploring opportunities to invest abroad.  
Chinese SOEs have elicited a great deal of attention with a number of high-profile cross-
border mergers: e.g., Lenovo’s $1.25 billion acquisition of IBM’s PC division in 2005, Sinopec 
Group’s $7.16 billion acquisition of Switzerland’s Addax Petroleum Corporation in 2009, and 
Shuanghui’s $4.7 billion acquisition of Smithfield in 2013. In many of these deals, the Chinese 
government represents the largest shareholder in the acquiring firm (Chen & Young, 2010). In 
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this regard, the role of state-ownership is seemingly a crucial factor in understanding the 
complete nature of Chinese cross-border merger activity. Thus, if a large number of Chinese 
cross-border M&As are being conducted by SOEs, then it becomes necessary to study the role of 
state-ownership in order to fully understand Chinese cross-border merger activity. 
One interesting facet that stands out when considering Chinese outward M&A activity 
over the last decade is the reported ‘premium’ involved with this activity (Chen & Young, 2010; 
Peng, 2012). Chinese firms engaging in cross-border acquisitions are reported to pay very high 
‘acquisition premiums’ that are well beyond the average premiums paid by U.S. acquirers: which 
have ranged from 30% to 50% of target market value over the past three decades (Walkling & 
Edmister, 1985; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987). The Economist (2010) reports that Chinese firms are 
never beat on willingness to pay for a target; and such overbidding is also characteristic of MNEs 
hailing from other emerging-markets (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011; Peng, 2012). These stylized 
facts suggest that Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) have a tendency to pay a good bit 
more for foreign acquisition targets as compared to the actual value of these targets. Sirower 
(1997) points out that a high acquisition premium represents a danger for acquiring firm value, as 
the ‘overpayment’ consumes from the expected synergies that must be achieved simply to 
sustain an acquired firm’s market value. In short, the payment of high acquisition premiums can 
ensure that an M&A is value-destroying for the acquiring firm, as it is nearly impossible to 
create sufficient synergies to compensate for over-paying in the first place. Moreover, Laamanen 
(2007) laments that the dynamics and drivers of acquisition premiums have yet to be fully 
understood. Accordingly, a better understanding of this behavior on the part of Chinese firms 
appears to be called for, as systematic overpayment for foreign-acquisition targets threatens the 
underlining health and profitability of these Chinese MNEs. 
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 A number of different determinants – on both the buy and sell side – have been identified 
by the existing literature as explaining the size of acquisition premiums. For instance, premiums 
have been found to be a function of several economic and financial factors: e.g., business cycles, 
demand and supply conditions in M&A markets, relative valuations, the competition for 
acquisition targets, and national pride (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011; Jahera, Hand, & Lloyd, 
1985; Nathan & O’Keefe, 1989; Shelton, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 2001; Slusky & Caves, 1991; 
Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Similarly, acquisition premiums have been found to be stimulated 
by several corporate factors: e.g., management hubris, resistance to takeovers, investment 
advisors, and merging-firms’ attributes (e.g., Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 1994; 
Robinson & Shane, 1990; Roll, 1986; Sinha, 1992). Finally, technology-intensive sectors and 
targets with large R&D investments have also been found to be characterized by relatively high 
acquisition premiums (Kohers & Kohers, 2001; Laamanen, 2007).  
The presence of state-ownership, however, is one particular attribute of acquiring firms 
that has been understudied by researchers. The neglect of this topic may be due to the fact that 
governments traditionally played a less-direct role in FDI, and SOEs restricted their operating 
scope to the domestic economy. Yet nowadays, governments – particularly in emerging-markets 
– actively encourage their SOEs to go abroad (e.g., the Chinese governments’ ‘Going global’ 
strategy—see Buckley et al., 2007); thus, the consideration of this topic becomes increasingly 
important. In other words, the role of state-ownership has seemingly become a salient factor that 
influences cross-border M&A activity. I will accordingly examine the effect of ownership (state-
owned versus non-state-owned) on the acquisition premiums paid by Chinese firms engaging in 
outward cross-border M&A activity. Chinese cross-border M&A activity provides an ideal 
setting in which to explore the question as to whether state-ownership matters, as Chinese MNEs 
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have rapidly embraced M&As as the primary mode to enter foreign markets (Peng, 2012; 
Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 2009). Moreover, the Chinese government represents a non-
negligible force behind this increased cross-border investment activity (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 
2008). Peng (2012) points out that one of the distinct aspects of Chinese MNEs is the previously 
underappreciated role played by the government as a governance force.  
Our empirical analysis – based on data comprising 450 Chinese cross-border acquisitions 
over the 1990 to 2011 period – yields two principal results. First, Chinese SOEs engaged in 
outward cross-border mergers pay higher acquisition premiums than do non-SOEs from China 
engaged in similar outward mergers. Second, when the acquirer’s ultimate parent is state-owned, 
but the acquirer is privately-owned, acquirers tend to pay an even higher acquisition premium as 
compared to the situation when both the ultimate parent and the acquirer have common 
ownership (i.e.. both are either state-owned or private-owned). This later result suggests – in line 
with the classic principal-agent problem – that state parents are not able to fully and effectively 
supervise private acquirers. I turn now to the derivations of our theoretical hypotheses. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
While many nations actively attract inward FDI and only passively support outward FDI, the 
Chinese government attaches importance to both inward and outward flows of FDI. In 1999, the 
Chinese government initiated the ‘Going global’ policy to promote Chinese investments abroad 
(Buckley et al., 2007). The intended rationale behind the policy was to support the seeking of 
strategic assets located abroad and to gain global knowledge and experiences—all in order to 
compete more effectively against foreign rivals in both domestic and global markets, and to 
ultimately enhance the development and welfare of China. As a result, Chinese cross-border 
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merger activity was most active in the following industries: natural resources (e.g., oil, gas, and 
minerals), services (e.g., banking, transportation, and construction), and some industries 
involving specialized technologies such as computer, automobile manufacturing, and electricity 
power generation. Strategic assets were deemed necessary by the government in order to meet 
the needs of two interconnected objectives: bolstering economic and social development at home, 
and compensating for firm-level competitive disadvantages (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
Encouraged by the government, Chinese MNEs have undertaken many cross-border 
M&As with the aim of accessing the target’s entire package of products and processes. Most of 
these MNEs were publicly-listed companies with leading positions in their home market (Chen 
& Young, 2010). The owners of Chinese listed companies consist of the state, legal persons, 
foreign financial institutions, and individual investors (Wei, 2007). Although corporatization and 
privatization of SOEs have been on-going since the 1990s (Ramamurti, 2000), most of the shares 
in Chinese listed companies are still controlled by the state (Lau et al., 2007). Thus, the 
government still has a strong hand in affecting decision making concerning cross-border M&A 
activity—particularly for SOEs. The governance of Chinese SOEs is quite different when 
compared to many western corporations which tend to be stand-alone economic entities that 
make decisions free of government intervention. As Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008) point out, it is 
the institutional (under)development that shapes firm’s strategic choices in China. The 
government, as the biggest shareholder of Chinese SOEs, plays a crucial governance role then in 
outward cross-border M&A activity.  
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Financial and Policy Support 
Privileged access to financial capital represents the most direct mechanism via which the 
Chinese government can affect the levels and types of cross-border merger activity. Relatively 
cheap labor costs and the resulting favorable export position that China has held over the past 
two decades, has led to it holding the world’s largest amount of foreign reserves: US$3,254.67 
billion by 2011 (The World Bank, 2012). Luo, Xue, and Han (2010) point out that the 
government made a purposeful effort to conserve foreign exchange in order to support outward 
FDI. This lack of serious financial constraint is in line with the fact that Chinese cross-border 
M&A activity appears to be characterized by some very large buyouts of developed-nation 
targets. Accordingly, the ample supply of foreign reserves that can be employed to fund cross-
border acquisition activity by Chinese MNEs certainly represents a driver of outward cross-
border M&A activity. 
The government is reported to provide state-owned enterprises with preferential access to 
these foreign reserves; hence, SOEs potentially face fewer financial constraints than do non-
SOEs. Specifically, many government funds have been dedicated to strictly support Chinese 
cross-border M&As. In addition, policies which support FDI activity include access to long-
term/mid-term loans from state-owned banks, interest subsidies, special funds dedicated to 
foreign trade development and foreign aid projects, export credits, simplified foreign exchange 
procedures, and others. Moreover, Chinese state-owned development banks serve as conduits of 
cheap loans to politically connected firms (Musacchio & Flores-Macias, 2009). The structure 
formulated to support the ‘Going global’ policy was designed to help all Chinese MNEs; but in 
reality, SOEs often receive more support from the government than do non-SOEs—particularly 
in terms of favorable financing (Li, Li, & Wen, 2009). The relevance of the literature on ‘soft 
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budget constraints’ (see Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003) is obvious, as state-owned enterprises 
might often fail on efficiency terms because they can ultimately count on being assisted in one 
manner or another by the government. In addition to privileged financial conditions, SOEs have 
also been reported to receive tax privileges, favorable insurance terms, and foreign industrial 
guidance—assistance that non-SOEs have been less likely to receive. The extent of policy 
support for non-SOEs has been more in terms of minor conveniences such as customs 
inspections and overseas protection
1
. The above patterns suggest favoritism in public policy 
toward SOEs at the expense of non-SOEs (Ahlstrom, Chen, & Yeh, 2010; Huang, 2003). In this 
regard, the ‘Going global’ policy might seemingly be far more beneficial to SOEs than to non-
SOEs. The substantial amount of policy support – particularly the privileged access to finance – 
received by SOEs means then that they can be far more aggressive in making foreign 
acquisitions as compared to their non-SOE competitors, and this would seemingly lead to their 
being able to offer higher acquisition premiums for foreign targets. In short, SOEs would 
seemingly face a softer budget constraint than non-SOEs, and they would also experience some 
additional policy advantages (tax write-offs, lower insurance rates, industrial benefits, etc…) that 
would enhance the value of foreign targets for SOEs as compared to non-SOEs.   
 
Social Welfare and National Strategy 
Another mechanism via which state-ownership affects Chinese cross-border M&A activity 
derives from the dual-objective of SOEs. As agents of the government, SOE decisions are 
subject to the influence and control of the government, and the government in turn might simply 
be aiming to leverage a firm's resources in order to promote social and political objectives 
                                                 
1 Source: “China’s going out strategy: difficult for private-owned enterprises: state-owned enterprises get higher rate of policy 
support.” http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2012/05/24114213251794.shtml 
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(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994, 1997; Dixit, 1997). Therefore, when making strategic decisions, SOEs 
often must consider two issues: whether the acquisition enhances the firm’s value and future 
profitability (akin to for-profit firms); and whether the acquisition contributes to national 
priorities, social welfare and economic development (a somewhat unique attribute of SOEs). In 
many instances, these dual objectives conflict with one another; i.e., the attainment of some 
socio-political objectives might come at the expense of profitability (Boardman, Freeman, & 
Eckel, 1986). In the context that I analyze, Chinese SOEs may sacrifice some profitability in 
order to satisfy certain national imperatives that are favored by the government. Recall that the 
government will represent a significant shareholder in the firm; hence, it is a vital stakeholder in 
the SOE. Accordingly, the SOE’s bidding price may not be merely based on estimations of 
future profits, but also on the potential to fulfill the objectives of a principal shareholder: the 
government. The improvement of social welfare is of course a decision-making factor that is 
fundamentally different from traditional models where profit-orientation is assumed.  
Our observation that the objective function of SOEs might be different is not novel, of 
course, as many scholars (e.g., Baumol, 1980; Wintrobe, 1985; Bos, 1986; Negandhi & Ganguly, 
1986) have argued that comparative empirical studies of firm behavior must recognize that 
sociopolitical goals are part of an SOE’s mandate. Accordingly, one must take into consideration 
that SOE decision-making will involve some national-welfare considerations when engaging in 
cross-border merger activity. Thus, when making business decisions, Chinese SOEs may be less 
profit-maximizing and instead more social-welfare maximizing. This nature of Chinese SOEs 
implies that when engaging in cross-border M&As, they not only offer an acquisition price based 
on the value of the target to the acquiring firm, but will also bid up that price to factor any 
additional benefits to the nation or society. 
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The Chinese central government attaches great importance to the interests of state 
property and frequently intervenes in economic activities (Young & McGuinness, 2001). The 
government is involved then in not only the major decisions of firms (e.g., the appointment of 
top managers), but also potentially in daily operations involving financial management—and in 
doing so, the Chinese government will take political considerations into account (Chen & Young, 
2010; Luo & Tung, 2007; Shenkar et al., 1998). Since China is a communist nation, the 
government often attempts to maintain a certain harmony in society (Walter & Howie, 2003). 
This governance environment suggests that many Chinese MNEs will make foreign investments 
with rationales in mind beyond pure profit: i.e., the seeking of strategic assets that aid national 
development. Accordingly, the decision criteria of profit-maximization will not have the same 
weight in SOEs as it will in non-SOEs; hence, non-governmental shareholders may not be able to 
influence SOEs to the same degree that they can influence non-SOEs. 
Since natural resources and global-level competencies are in short supply in the home 
market, Chinese firms are likely to bid high for these resources as they potentially value the 
targets quite highly (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). For example, Sinopec’s (a Chinese SOE) $2.1 
billion acquisition of Daylight Energy (a Canadian oil and gas firm) for CDN $10.08 per share 
represented an acquisition premium that was 70 percent higher than Daylight’s average price 
during the 20 pre-announcement trading days, and represented more than double the average 32 
percent premium paid for comparable cash bids of North American energy explorers
2
. The stated 
rationale behind such a high premium was the ability to garner access to natural resources that 
China lacks, but which are of course crucial for development. The Chinese government has 
deemed the acquisition of natural resources to be essential in order to maintain the nation’s 
                                                 
2  Data compiled by Bloomberg. Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-09/sinopec-agrees-to-buy-daylight-energy-
for-2-1-billion-to-meet-fuel-demand.html. 
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growth and achieve economic advancement. Accordingly, Sinopec’s willingness to complete the 
deal – despite a very high premium – is in line with the idea that SOEs are quite sensitive to 
government influence and as a consequence must consider social/political objectives in addition 
to pure profit objectives. Firms that are not state-owned-enterprises would be clearly less subject 
to such social-welfare considerations and relatively more interested in simply conducting cross-
border deals that enhance their future viability and profitability. Hence, non-SOEs are less likely 
to be willing to pay very high acquisition premiums for foreign targets, as ensuring enhanced 
value and profitability is more likely to be their ultimate objective.  
 
Managerial Efficiency and Information Asymmetry 
SOEs are generally considered to be less effective as compared to private and other public 
enterprises (i.e., non-SOEs) when it comes to making sound corporate decisions (Boardman, 
Eckel, & Vining, 1986; Boardman & Vining, 1989; Megginson, Nash, & van Randenborgh, 
1994).
3
 Governments are certainly the ultimate owner of SOEs, but are not often considered to 
have the appropriate competence and expertise in corporate operations that would lead to 
effective decision making and oversight (Chen & Young, 2010). In this vein, Chen et al. (2011) 
find that political connections reduce SOE investment efficiency, but do not reduce non-SOE 
investment efficiency. Accordingly, government intervention in SOEs via majority state 
ownership and via the appointment of politically-connected managers will tend to distort 
financial investment behavior and harm investment efficiency. Such corporate inefficiencies 
would lead in turn to relatively inefficient cross-border M&A activity as compared to non-SOEs.  
                                                 
3 A 'private enterprise' is a company whose shares are not traded on a public exchange (owned by an individual(s) or family). 
'Other public enterprises' refers to those public firms which are not state-owned. Public firms could be owned by foreigners, 
individuals, or collectively-owned, etc. 
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A number of specific limitations of Chinese SOEs have been reported that suggest 
inflexible decision making and a lack of management versatility. First, non-SOEs are considered 
to be more efficient in dealing with risks due to their being free of government intervention and 
masters of their own financial health; thus they deploy cash in a more agile manner and hedge 
against risks. The use of funds by SOEs, on the other hand, must go through an elaborate process 
of examination and approval by different layers of the hierarchy. Second, it is reported that 
private and public enterprises value the feedback from the management of overseas subsidiaries 
more so than do SOEs, as they often organize regular meetings with overseas management in 
order to assess and improve international financial strategy and adjust plans accordingly. Yet it is 
reported that the frequency of such meetings and adjustments is relatively low in SOEs
4
. Third, 
SOEs may be subject to substantial internal conflicts due to the differing objectives of 
government ownership and minority-shareholder ownership; such conflict has been referred to as 
principal–principal governance conflicts (Chen & Young, 2010; Dharwadkar, George, & 
Brandes, 2000; Young et al., 2008). 
In addition to the above, property rights have been considered to be more attenuated in 
public than in private corporations. As pointed out by De Alessi (1980: 27-28): “The crucial 
difference between private and publicly owned firms is that ownership in the latter is 
nontransferable. Since this rules out specialization in their ownership, it inhibits the 
capitalization of future consequences into current transfer prices and reduces owners' incentives 
to monitor managerial behavior.” This argument can be carried over to Chinese SOEs, as their 
managers are not specialized in firm operations and their compensation is not closely tied to firm 
performance. In fact, the role of SOE managers is considered to be threefold: entrepreneur, 
                                                 
4 Source: “China’s going out strategy: difficult for private-owned enterprises: state-owned enterprises get higher rate of policy 
support.” http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2012/05/24114213251794.shtml. 
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governmental official, and leader of the SOE community (Perotti, Sun, & Zou, 1999). The focus 
of an SOE manager’s attention is likely then to be less dedicated to the firm’s ultimate viability 
and profitability, and more dedicated to other objectives such as social and political harmony. 
Hence, the incentives for Chinese SOE managers to strive for shareholder value will be relatively 
weak—particularly when compared to the incentives of managers in non-SOEs.  
Beyond the poor incentive structure for SOE managers noted above, resides a manager-
selection problem. The selection of many SOE managers is often not done on a performance 
basis, but instead driven by government-nomination (Zhang & Parker, 2002). While China has 
undertaken several major governance reforms in order to decentralize governmental control and 
delegate responsibilities to managers (Ramamurti, 2000), many SOE managers are still party 
appointees from government hierarchies. Kato and Long (2006) point out that CEOs are selected 
by the government, and Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) show that some twenty-seven percent of 
the CEOs in partially-privatized Chinese firms were former, or current, government bureaucrats. 
Moreover, many of these managerial positions are only for a finite period; hence, SOE managers 
often ‘rotate’ to a similar or higher position with another SOE after a certain period. Agency 
theory suggests then that managers might have a strong desire to expand their firm (i.e., ‘empire 
building’) in order to seek personal benefits by, for instance, improving their reputation amongst 
peers (Jensen, 1986; Narayanan, 1985). As a result, government-official managers may exercise 
control over SOEs for their own objectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998), and thus 
be more attentive to their government superiors as compared to shareholders, since the 
government superiors have influence over their next position. The less attention given to 
minority shareholders suggests less attention to the concern of these shareholders: i.e., 
profitability. Huang et al. (2011) also show that the hubris of top executives at Chinese SOEs 
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increases the likelihood of investment; hence, overconfident managers might overestimate the 
return from mergers and thus undertake outward mergers that do not add value (Roll, 1986). 
Accordingly, SOEs are likely to be less profitable as compared to non-SOEs due to inefficiencies 
resulting from attenuated property rights in these enterprises (Boardman, Eckel, & Vining, 1986).  
Managers also face substantial challenges in successfully consummating cross-border 
deals due to the information asymmetries faced by parties involved in the M&A (Kang & Kim, 
2008; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2007). Information asymmetries exist in the processes of 
due diligence, financial negotiations, and post-acquisition corporate planning (Reuer, Tong, & 
Wu, 2012). The acquirer has difficulty in assessing the true value of the target firm due to a few 
reasons: 1) the target may not disclose complete information about itself; 2) the acquirers and 
targets belong to different institutional environments (Shimizu et al., 2004). While information 
asymmetries are endemic to domestic M&A activity, this problem will be more acute when it 
comes to cross-border M&A activity: where acquirers also suffer from ‘liability of foreignness’ 
(Zaheer, 1995). In addition, some private information about the target firm may be tacit which 
makes it improbable that the acquiring firm can elicit such information.  
The previously mentioned inefficiencies concerning SOE decision making and 
management can further enhance the information-asymmetry problem by making it harder for 
SOEs to formulate a sound bidding strategy that will closely converge on the target’s true value. 
As Laamanen (2007) points out, higher premiums may result when target-firms resources are 
difficult to value. First, the hierarchical organizational structures involved with Chinese SOEs 
make it difficult to efficiently process information from abroad, as information does not 
efficiently move upwards through the vertical hierarchy. Thus, collection of overseas feedback 
and due diligence are relatively more challenging for SOEs. Second, the interests of SOE 
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managers are often not tightly coupled with the profitability of the firm; hence, the managers 
may not make significant efforts to assess the target in terms of a sound bidding strategy and 
price. When it comes to the managers of private/public enterprises, their interests largely depend 
on the firm’s ultimate profitability; hence, they will seemingly be more likely to undertake a 
sound bidding strategy that economizes on acquisition cost. Third, the restraint and supervision 
mechanisms are often relatively less powerful in SOEs due to attenuated property rights and 
state-ownership. For instance, when it comes to the use of government funds, the usage of these 
funds is not specific to a particular manager but instead to the whole firm. The lack of sufficient 
monitoring can then lead to non-frugal use of these funds.   
Summarizing the above, SOEs (1) have privileged access to financial support from 
governments; (2) are incentivized to not only consider firm-based competitive gains but also 
broader social and political goals that are espoused by the government; and (3) are relatively less 
efficient in terms of decision making and corporate financial management. In light of these 
factors, SOEs are more likely to pay higher acquisition premiums than are non-SOEs when 
seeking cross-border acquisition targets—an a priori which can be expressed as the following, 
 
H(1): In the context of outward cross-border merger activity, Chinese SOEs will tend to 
pay higher acquisition premiums as compared to non-SOEs. 
 
State-Owned Parent with a Private-Owned Acquiring Firm 
In many cross-border M&As, the acquiring firm is actually an overseas subsidiary of a home-
nation-based parent. While in many instances the parent and the subsidiary will share a similar 
ownership status (i.e., both are privately owned or state owned), there are instances when the 
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parent will have one ownership status (i.e., state-owned), while the subsidiary will have a 
different ownership status (i.e., privately-owned). We see this phenomenon in the context of 
Chinese cross-border acquisitions, as sometimes state-owned parents do not engage in direct 
acquisitions of foreign targets, but do so instead via privately-owned overseas subsidiaries 
(where the state-owned parent holds a minority stake in the private subsidiary). For example, a 
Chinese private subsidiary based in Australia (Yunnan Tin Australia Invest) acquired an 
Australian company (Metallica Minerals) for $83.75 million in 2007; yet in this context, the 
Chinese government represents the ultimate parent of ‘Yunnan Tin Australia Invest’.  
One possible explanation for such a phenomenon is that the Chinese government uses its 
Australian subsidiary as a springboard to bypass stringent trade barriers: e.g., quota restrictions, 
anti-dumping penalties, and special tariff penalties (Luo & Tung, 2007). Additionally, many 
nations have expressed concern about the political aims and economic ambitions involved with 
the rapid increase in cross-border merger activity by Chinese SOEs. Thus, Chinese SOEs have 
faced some restraints when it comes to FDI activity: e.g., increasing investment barriers, political 
opposition, and the formation of new institutional restrictions (Davies, 2010). Furthermore, 
Chinese SOEs have been considered to be non-transparent, prone to government intervention, 
lacking in managerial efficiency, and rife with opportunistic behavior; hence, the managers of 
potential foreign targets may be cautious when it comes to the prospect of being acquired by a 
Chinese SOE. Such caution might be based on the concern that future career conditions and 
prospects might be substantially limited within a large state-owned-enterprise based in China. 
Accordingly, using an overseas private subsidiary to acquire a foreign target could represent a 
sound strategy via which the state-owned MNE can bypass some of the resistance it would 
otherwise elicit from host governments and target management. 
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Yet a strategy to employ overseas private subsidiaries to act as the principal acquirer of 
foreign assets can also involve some additional issues that could be costly. These additional costs 
come on top of the previously raised issues – privileged access to financial and government 
support, broader social objectives, and less-effective financial management – that led to the first 
hypothesis: Chinese SOEs will generally pay higher premiums than non-SOEs when acquiring 
foreign targets. Hence, the existence of additional inefficiencies suggests that acquisition 
premiums may be even higher when a state-owned enterprise acts as a parent and makes an 
indirect acquisition of a foreign target via a privately-owned subsidiary. I focus on three factors 
which suggest that acquisition premiums in this context will be quite high.  
First, the control and coordination between the state-owned parent and the private-owned 
subsidiary can be quite complex and less efficient when compared with the situation where both 
the parent and the subsidiary have a similar ownership structure (Eckel & Vermaelen, 1986). 
SOEs and private/public enterprises are in essence distinct ownership structures and are thus 
managed very differently. Such differences can make the information-asymmetry problem quite 
severe when it comes to a state-owned parent and a private-owned subsidiary. In China, SOEs 
are centrally controlled by the government and managers are implementers of government 
decisions; but in private/public enterprises, decisions are often made independently by managers. 
This contradiction in management style can create barriers and difficulties with coordination, 
communication, negotiation, and information transfer—qualities that are necessary in order to 
successfully engage in an efficient bidding strategy for target resources. In this vein, Boardman 
and Vining (1989) point out that joint-ownership patterns in mixed enterprises can generate 
conflicts between the public and private shareholders—conflicts which lead to a high degree of 
managerial ‘cognitive dissonance’. Therefore, partial privatization may be worse than complete 
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privatization or continued state ownership
5
. Moreover, MNEs engaging in cross-border activities 
face even greater challenges of this nature (Boardman, Freeman, & Eckel, 1986). Such frictions 
may then lead to decision-making mistakes that ultimately lead to overbidding in the context of 
cross-border M&A activity. 
Second, state-owned parents might find it difficult to adequately monitor and control a 
private subsidiary that is engaging in negotiations to purchase a target firm. Compared to a 
China-based parent, an overseas private-subsidiary acquirer will be closer in terms of distance to 
the target. By invoking distance, I primarily refer to geographic distance but are cognizant that 
cultural, administrative, knowledge and connectedness distances (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010) 
will yield parallel effects. In light of the relevant distances involved, the private acquirer will 
face fewer information asymmetries regarding the quality of the target firm and regarding an 
accurate price that reflects that quality. Yet, the state-owned parent will find it quite difficult due 
to the various dimensions of distance to place a fair and accurate price on the foreign target.  
Third, recall that many scholars (e.g., Mueller, 1969) attribute the frequency of non-
synergistic mergers to the existence of managerial incentives that favor increasing the size of a 
company at the expense of the ultimate shareholders. This ‘empire building’ rationale behind 
merger activity highlights that acquiring-firm managers personally benefit (e.g., with higher 
salaries, merger bonuses, and other managerial perks) from acquisitions that lead to a 
substantially larger firm. That said, concentrated ownership in these firms is often thought to 
mitigate this classic principal-agent problem (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), 
as a large shareholder (e.g., a parent firm) will have every incentive to accurately monitor the 
subsidiary and make sure that it does not engage in value-decreasing merger activity. Yet, 
                                                 
5 Boardman and Vining (1989) hold that mixed enterprises involve part of the stock in private and part in public hands, thus they 
come in many different forms and vary considerably in terms of the extent of the split between government/private ownership.   
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Chinese state-owned parents might find it difficult to take on this monitoring role due to the 
various distances involved and due to the fact that their prime objective is the acquisition of 
foreign assets that ultimately enhance national welfare. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that 
managers indulge in non-value maximizing behavior in high information asymmetry 
environments. As an emerging-market nation, China has a relatively underdeveloped market 
structure; hence, the degree of information asymmetry amongst market participants is relatively 
high, which provides managers with greater latitude in which to engage in their own objectives 
by expropriating wealth from outside shareholders (Kim, Kitsabunnarat, & Nofsinger, 2004). A 
state-owned parent lacks then the necessary supervision mechanisms to control a potential moral-
hazard problem with the overseas-subsidiary acquirer. Thus, private acquirers might be able to 
take advantage of the information asymmetries involved with this parent/subsidiary relationship 
by engaging in mergers that enhance managerial salaries and perks at the ultimate expense of the 
state-owned parent. I should also point out that state-owned parents may simply not be interested 
in financial gains; hence, they may be unwilling and uninterested in engaging in substantial 
monitoring efforts. For instance, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2008) note that over one-half of 
Chinese listed SOEs pay no dividends despite high earnings. Furthermore, the managers of state-
owned acquirers may be less incentivized to take advantage of the relevant information 
asymmetries between the parent and acquiring firms. In sum, the state-owned parent suffers from 
an information disadvantage and from a risk of information withholding by the private subsidiary; 
and the state-owned parent’s inability and/or unwillingness to effectively monitor the private 
subsidiary can lead to a moral-hazard problem where private acquirers might engage in 
expensive non-synergistic mergers that involve overbidding. 
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Summarizing the above, state-owned parents face some additional costs – control and 
coordination costs due to the different organizational structures; distance-based information 
asymmetries; and moral hazard issues concerning the privately-owned acquirer – when they 
employ a privately-owned overseas subsidiary to act as the acquirer in a cross-border M&A. In 
light of these factors, acquisition premiums may be higher when a state-owned enterprise acts as 
a parent and makes an indirect acquisition of a foreign target via a privately-owned subsidiary—
an a priori which can be expressed as the following, 
 
H(2): When the acquirer’s ultimate parent is state-owned and the acquirer is private-
owned, acquirers will tend to pay an even higher acquisition premium as 
compared to cross-border acquisitions where both the acquirer and parent share a 
common ownership structure. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
I obtained data on Chinese outward cross-border merger activity from the Thomson SDC 
platinum database. Thomson SDC platinum provides a comprehensive set of global M&As with 
information on the name, ownership status, geographic location, industry, assets/sales/equity, 
and ultimate parent for both the acquiring and target firms. In addition, Thomson also provides 
information on the date of the announcement, value of the transaction, premium offer price, 
attitude of the M&A, and other transaction details. After compiling the data, I were left with 479 
Chinese outward cross-border acquisitions where I have information on the premium paid by the 
acquirer in order to purchase the target—where acquisition premium, of course, represents the 
dependent variable for our study. I necessarily dropped a few additional observations as some of 
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the key explanatory variables involved missing observations. Hence, our final sample consists of 
450 Chinese outward cross-border M&As over the 1990-2011 period.  
Table 2.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of our sample of Chinese cross-border 
M&As by noting the number of sampled mergers per target nation. I also note the average 
acquisition premium associated with each nation in our sample. In line with previous empirical 
work considering Chinese outward FDI patterns (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007), almost half of the 
target firms are located in Hong Kong (47.56%). As discussed below, these cross-border M&As 
must be understood as fundamentally different as compared to other cross-border M&As in our 
sample. Beyond Hong Kong, Australia and Canada represent the two most popular target nations 
for Chinese outward M&A activity—two countries relatively rich in natural resources such as 
oil/gas and minerals.
6
 The frequency of cross-border activity that targets these two nations is in 
line with the idea that Chinese cross-border M&As are driven in part by the goal of obtaining 
natural resources. In addition, targets located in the U.S., U.K., and Japan represent a relatively 
high proportion of Chinese outward merger activity. This particular merger activity conforms to 
the idea that Chinese cross-border M&As are driven in part by the goal of learning from nations 
that have relatively advanced technologies and financial management practices. 
I use the 4-week acquisition premium as reported in Thomson SDC as our relevant 
dependent variable in this study (hereafter referred to as premium). In particular, the premium is 
the difference between the offer price and the target-closing price some 4 weeks prior to the 
merger announcement—where this difference is expressed as a percentage of that target-closing 
price 4 weeks prior to the merger announcement.
 
Reuer, Tong, and Wu (2012) argue that the 
four-week time lag is optimal as it yields a measure that is not confounded by either the takeover 
                                                 
6 The percentages of target nations are calculated excluding Hong Kong.   
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announcement or the leakage of information prior to the announcement; in addition, they point 
out that this means of measuring acquisition premiums has been traditionally employed by those 
engaged in empirical scholarship of M&A activity (e.g., Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Kisgen, 
Qian, & Song, 2009). Accordingly, I bow to precedent and also employ the four-week 
acquisition premium as our dependent variable of interest. As noted above, Table 2.1 also lists 
the average acquisition premium associated with each target nation in our sample of Chinese 
outward M&As. While that acquisition premium is positive on average (19.54%) for all of the 
mergers in our sample, developed-nation targets appear to elicit slightly higher acquisition 
premiums (34.34%) as compared to targets from emerging-markets (14.82%). This finding 
echoes similar results in Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2011) that emerging-market firms tend to pay 
higher acquisition premiums for the developed-nation targets than for developing-nation targets. 
The ownership status of the acquiring firm and the parent firm represent the focal 
explanatory variables for this study. Ownership status is recorded as public, private, subsidiary, 
joint venture, and state owned in the Thomson SDC database. In particular, government 
ownership is coded 1 if the government holds a majority stake (50% or more); hence, this 
indicates that the government is the controlling owner of the firm. Accordingly, I define a state-
ownership dummy variable (hereafter referred to as SOE) as equal to 1, if the acquiring firm is 
state controlled either directly or via its parents being state controlled. I use then non-SOE to 
designate for the other ownership statuses where the state has either a minority or null stake (i.e., 
the case in which the government does not own a controlling stake). Furthermore, I divide this 
state-ownership dummy into two separate dummy variables: “acquirer SOE” is equal to 1 if the 
acquirer is itself a state-controlled enterprise independent of the parent’s ownership status; and 
“parent SOE” is equal to 1 if the acquirer is not state-controlled (i.e., it is privately controlled), 
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but either its immediate or ultimate parent is state-controlled. In our sample of Chinese outward 
cross-border M&A activity, the majority are undertaken by acquirer-parent pairings that do not 
involve state control (88.45%). Furthermore, deals involving controlling state ownership 
constitute some 11.55% of our sampled observations: with a subset of these deals involving a 
state-controlled acquirer, and a subset involving a state-controlled parent combined with a 
private acquirer.  
In our empirical analysis, I control for several additional factors which might be 
important determinants of acquisition premiums. I first define a dummy for Hong Kong (HK) 
which takes on the value of 1 if the target firm is based in Hong Kong. Such a control is essential, 
as mainland Chinese investments in Hong Kong are considered to be quite different when 
compared with Chinese investments in other nations. As pointed out by Peng (2012: 98), “some 
Chinese MNEs’ investment in Hong Kong can be explained by capital round-tripping. In other 
words, some Chinese MNEs invest in these ‘tax havens’ to transform themselves into ‘foreign 
domiciled’ companies, and then they can invest in China as a foreign investor to take advantage 
of tax and other concessions back home. Hong Kong has long served such a role.” Accordingly, I 
control for Hong Kong targets since the fundamentals behind these particular ‘cross-border 
mergers’ are clearly quite particular. Specifically, I allow our main explanatory variables to have 
a differential effect for cross-border M&As involving a HK-based target firm. Such an 
estimation strategy allows us to consider the state-ownership effect on the acquisition premiums 
involved with true cross-border merger activity—i.e., mergers not involving Hong Kong. 
I also control for a ‘strategic industry effect’, as a number of industries have been 
designated by the Chinese government as sectors deserving favorable treatment due to their 
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impact on the greater Chinese economy.
7
 It stands to reason that such ‘favored’ sectors will 
receive conditions that might allow firms (both SOEs and non-SOEs) to pay even higher 
premiums in order to acquire foreign targets. In other words, the strategic resources and 
capabilities embedded in foreign targets represent strategic assets that may enhance China’s 
domestic development and international competitiveness; hence, the acquisition premiums in 
these industries will be higher. Accordingly, I define an industry to be strategic if it falls into one 
of the three general SIC categories – metal mining, oil and gas extraction, and automotive – that 
were identified by Zhang (2010) as strategic sectors in terms of Chinese outward FDI.
8
 I expect 
higher acquisition premiums to be paid for foreign targets when these targets reside in one of 
these industries. 
I also control for several characteristics of the merger. First, a number of studies have 
found the closeness between the acquirer and target to be an influential factor on post-M&A 
performance (Patel & King, 2011). Therefore, I generate a variable that captures whether the 
target and the acquirer share the same primary SIC-2 industry (hereafter referred to as closeness). 
Second, I control for the presence of competing bidders (hereafter referred to as competing 
bidder), a factor that has repeatedly been found to increase merger premiums (Slusky & Caves, 
1991). Third, the information-asymmetry problem faced by acquirers attempting to assess the 
true value of a target (Shimizu et al., 2004) is an issue that might be exacerbated with geographic 
distance. As mentioned in our theoretical formulations, geographic distance can also be a proxy 
for other distances: cultural, administrative, knowledge, and connectedness (Berry, Guillén, & 
Zhou, 2010). To control for distance-effects, I construct a dummy variable (hereafter referred to 
                                                 
7 See “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for National Strategic Emerging Industries” from the Central People’s Government of the 
People’s Republic of China (http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-07/20/content_2187770.htm). 
8 According to the Vice Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission, Xiaoqiang Zhang, energy, natural 
resources, and the advanced manufacturing industries will constitute the strategic focus of China’s outward FDI (Zhang, 2010). 
Thus, I define the “strategic industry” dummy variable to be one if the target industry is in one of the three general SIC industry 
categories of metal mining, oil and gas extraction, and automotive. 
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as same nation) which takes on the value of 1 if the target and the acquirer both have 
headquarters in the same nation and 0 otherwise. In essence, this controls for situations where a 
Chinese firm already has a subsidiary in a host market and makes an acquisition in the host 
nation via that subsidiary. Fourth, to capture the size and the nature of the transaction, I 
respectively use the logarithm of the value of the transaction in millions US $ (hereafter referred 
to as transaction value), and a dummy variable equal to one for friendly acquisitions (hereafter 
referred to as friendly). I expect acquisition premiums to be higher when the cross-border merger 
can be characterized as both large and friendly.  
I also control for three characteristics of the target. In particular, I use the log of the 
target's total assets in millions US $ (hereafter referred to as target total assets) to represent 
target size, the book to value ratio per share (hereafter referred to as target book value) to proxy 
for the target’s quality, and the market-to-book ratio (hereafter referred to as target market-to-
book ratio) to capture the capital market’s judgment of the target’s stand-alone value. Table 2.2 
presents the descriptive statistics for these variables along with the correlation coefficients. 
Finally, our empirical analysis employs a set of time fixed-effects to account for 
aggregate, economy-wide events that may occur over time and commonly affect all firms (e.g. 
the business cycle). In addition, I use industry fixed-effects based on the target SIC-2 industries 
in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across industries that is not captured by our 
previous explanatory variables. I also use country-fixed effects to control for any target-nation 
specific characteristics that might significantly affect cross-border acquisition premiums; e.g., 
differences in tax codes (Scholes & Wolfson, 1990), regulatory and legal differences (Rossi & 
Volpin, 2004), as well as cultural differences which might impact the premium paid by Chinese 
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acquirers in particular countries. With the above priors in mind, I formulate the following OLS 
equation in order to test our first hypothesis: 
 
                                                                          
 
where            is the acquisition premium paid by the acquiring firm in merger i – a merger 
that took place in industry j at year t. In addition,        captures the effect of acquirer state-
ownership (either direct or via the parents) for those cross-border merger transactions where the 
target is not based in Hong Kong; while               captures the differential effect of 
acquirer state-ownership for those cross-border mergers where the target is based in Hong Kong. 
The vector            contains the control variables discussed above (strategic industry, 
closeness, competing bidders, same nation, transaction value, friendly, target total assets, target 
book value and target market-to-book ratio),    are year fixed-effects,    are industry fixed-
effects,    are target-nation fixed-effects, and      is a random error term which is assumed to be 
correlated amongst mergers in the same industry. To control for heteroskedasticity, I estimate 
White robust standard errors. The empirical implementation of our first hypothesis consists of 
testing the hypothesis     . 
 To test our second hypothesis, I enhance the previous model by splitting the effect of 
state-ownership among i) the effect due to acquirers that are themselves state-owned and ii) the 
effect due to those mergers where the state-owned parent (either immediate or ultimate) employs 
a privately-owned subsidiary to complete the cross-border acquisition. The following OLS 
equation allows us to test our second hypothesis: 
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and the empirical implementation of this second hypothesis consists of testing whether      . 
 Table 2.3 reports the estimation results for the tests concerning our first hypothesis. 
While all of the estimations reported in Table 2.3 involve the full set of control variables and 
time fixed effects from specification 1 when testing for the impact of state-ownership on 
acquisition premiums, column (1) reports results where I only control for industry fixed-effects 
(i.e., target-nation fixed effects are excluded), while column (2) reports results where I only 
control for target-nation fixed-effects (i.e., industry fixed effects are excluded). Finally, column 
(3) reports the estimation results for the full model where all of the controls and all of the fixed 
effects are employed: i.e., industry, target-nation and time fixed-effects are all invoked. The 
coefficient estimate for the pivotal state-ownership dummy variable (SOE) is positive and 
significantly different from zero in all three estimations. The size of the coefficient estimate 
suggests that Chinese SOEs engaged in cross-border M&As tend to pay an acquisition premium 
which is circa 50% higher than non-SOEs, ceteris paribus. This effect is robust across all three 
models, and indicates strong empirical support for our first hypothesis.  
The relevance of the Hong Kong differential effect is also worth mentioning. The 
coefficient estimate for the interaction of state-ownership with the Hong Kong dummy is 
negative and significantly different from zero. Thus, the overall effect for cross-border mergers 
where a state-owned Chinese firm acquires a Hong Kong target firm – where this total effect is 
essentially the sum of the two coefficient estimates – is not significantly different from zero. 
Accordingly, our results suggest that Chinese SOE acquirers do not pay extra-normal acquisition 
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premiums for targets based in Hong Kong—a result in line with ‘round-tripping’ priors and in 
line with lower distance factors. This finding is important in that it confirms our estimation 
strategy, and is relevant for future empirical work on Chinese cross border merger activity; i.e., it 
is fundamental to control for this crucial ‘Hong Kong’ dimension of heterogeneity. 
I find that Chinese acquirers pay relatively higher premiums in the strategic industries; 
namely, petroleum and natural gas, mining, and automobiles. This finding is in line with our 
previous discussion and other anecdotal evidence which suggests that some of the industries 
received targeted-support under the auspices of the Chinese government’s 'Going global' strategy. 
I also notice that the strategic industry variable is not significant when industry fixed effects are 
not invoked (column 2). This suggests that controlling for the idiosyncratic industry-specific 
effects is a crucial first step in order to elicit the strategic-industry effect. Consistent with 
Laamanen (2007), I find a significant negative relationship between acquisition premiums and a 
target’s market-to-book ratio. I also find that the presence of competing bidders is significantly 
and positively related to acquisition premiums. However, the additional target-firm 
characteristics and merger characteristics (i.e., transaction value and friendly) do not seem to 
involve statistical significance. This might be due to the fact that I control for over 50 industry 
specific fixed-effects, 17 year fixed-effects, and 110 target-nation fixed-effects—all of which 
will surely account for a great deal of variability in acquisition premiums.  
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results for the tests concerning our second hypothesis: 
where the three estimations take a similar structure – except for the splitting of the SOE variable 
into Acquirer SOE and Parent SOE – and yield similar results to the estimations reported in 
Table 2.3. As with our initial results in Table 2.3, the Table 2.4 results also indicate the pivotal 
importance of controlling for targets based in Hong Kong, controlling for industry, target-nation 
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and time fixed effects, and controlling for merger and target-firm characteristics—which are 
even more pronounced in the Table 2.4 estimations.  
I find strong support in this model specification for our first hypothesis, as the coefficient 
estimates for both acquirer SOE and parent SOE are positive and significant. Moreover, I also 
find support for our second hypothesis as state-owned parent firms that involve privately-owned 
subsidiaries completing the cross-border acquisition (parent SOE) tend to pay an acquisition 
premium that is at least 63 percentage points higher on average as compared to non-SOE 
acquirers. Whereas, acquisitions that simply involve a state-owned acquirer (Acquirer SOE) tend 
to pay an acquisition premium of some 40 percentage points higher on average as compared to 
non-SOE acquirers. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
I have examined the effect of state-ownership on the acquisition premiums paid by Chinese firms 
engaged in outward cross-border M&A activity. In light of the fact that SOEs (1) have privileged 
access to financial support from governments; (2) have incentives to consider broader social 
welfare and political interests when making decisions; and (3) are often less efficient in terms of 
decision making and financial management, they tend to pay higher acquisition premiums when 
engaging in cross-border merger activity as compared to non-SOEs. What is more, I find that 
when the acquirer’s parent is state-owned but the acquirer is private-owned, acquirers will tend 
to pay even higher acquisition premiums. This later result suggests that state-owned parents are 
unable to effectively monitor privately-owned acquirers that act as their agent.   
I anticipate that this study will contribute to existing literature on cross-border M&A 
activity by shedding more light on the relevant role that government ownership increasingly 
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plays in global competition. Research on the government’s role (and state ownership in particular) 
in cross-border business activity is certainly called for, as much of the existing literature tends to 
view governments as an impediment to such activity. Yet in many emerging-market nations – 
where domestic enterprises have substantially enhanced their capabilities over the last two 
decades (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009) – the role of the government can be quite pervasive. In 
particular, some governments now encourage their enterprises to go abroad and compete in the 
global strategic environment. Many of these large enterprises are state-owned, and this 
ownership structure presents some challenges to traditional theories and their underlying 
assumptions. Therefore, our view towards the role of government and SOEs in the modern world 
needs to be updated accordingly. In light of this, strategy scholars should rethink the previously 
underappreciated role of government (and state-ownership in particular) when it comes to the 
global activities of MNEs. 
The study presented here has uncovered some aspects of SOEs by examining the role of 
state-ownership on the acquisition premiums paid by acquirers when engaging in cross-border 
M&A activity. Nevertheless, I should point out some limitations involved with this research. 
First, the sample size is certainly healthy, but it would not be accurate to consider the sample to 
be exhaustive. Second, the generalizability of the findings is limited by this being a study of 
outward cross-border merger activity emanating from a single – albeit important – nation. Third, 
I have not uncovered the full complexity of the relationship between the parent-firm and the 
acquiring firm, as further work could unbundle this relationship into further detail. A general 
challenge involved with this kind of study is that it often necessitates cross-level research with 
the mixture of national-level, industry-level, and firm-level variables, which is likely to make the 
empirical design and logic explanations more complex.   
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State-owned enterprises are certainly an interesting institutional entity as they 
simultaneously involve elements of both business and governments, and also involve unique 
features of their own. SOEs present a global image of their home-nation to the world, and carry 
the responsibility of promoting the nation’s political, economic and social interests while also 
attempting to satisfy profit-oriented shareholders. Such conflicts do not apply only to Chinese 
SOEs but can be generalized to SOEs in both emerging-market and developed nations. 
Accordingly, future studies of SOE behavior in cross-border business may want to consider: (1) 
What are the mechanisms through which SOEs can help improve the social welfare of a nation; 
(2) how might government-government relationships affect the internationalization of SOEs; (3) 
through which channels can SOEs bring back home the knowledge they learn from their 
international investment experiences. If these state-owned enterprises are overbidding in order to 
secure strategic international resources and knowledge, it is imperative that they are successful in 
transferring this knowledge to their home operations and also successful in having the 
knowledge disseminated throughout the home country in order to benefit the nation as a whole. 
Despite the surge of SOEs in global business activity over the last decade, the benefits 
and costs of state-ownership are still unclear in extant research. Yet, a number of early empirical 
studies view government ownership as negatively influencing the efficiency of firm’s operations. 
In particular, a few studies have confirmed the inefficiency of SOEs as compared to non-SOEs 
(Boardman, Eckel, & Vining, 1986; Megginson, et al., 1994). With this previous literature in 
mind, many observers have expressed concern that the rise in SOE-based global economic 
activity might bring about an equivalent rise in inefficient MNE activity. In this vein, the main 
contention of this essay is simple but important: state-owned enterprises in the Chinese context 
do appear to be overpaying for foreign targets when they engage in cross-border acquisition 
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activity; hence, to the degree that systematically overpaying for a target indicates inefficiencies 
on the part of acquiring firms, observers should be concerned about the negative efficiency 
implications potentially involved with increased global economic activity by state-owned 
enterprises. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1. Target Nation of Chinese Cross-Border M&A, 1990-2011. 
 
Economic Category Target nation Freq. Percent Average 
premium (%) 
Developed Nations Austria 1   0.22 64.29 
  Israel 1   0.22 39.73 
 Netherlands 1   0.22 33.20 
 Taiwan 1   0.22 15.27 
 South Korea 1   0.22 34.23 
 Spain 1   0.22   2.85 
 Switzerland 2   0.44   2.81 
 Germany 3   0.67 28.46 
 Norway 2   0.44 49.52 
 New Zealand 6   1.33 17.38 
  Japan 12   2.67  -8.50 
 United Kingdom 13   2.89 35.87 
 United States 20   4.44 85.75 
 Singapore 24   5.33 20.10 
 Canada 44   9.78 46.04 
 Australia 99 22.00 28.89 
 Hong Kong 214 47.56   8.34 
Emerging-Market Nations Indonesia 1 0.22   5.16 
 South Africa 1 0.22 28.17 
 Thailand 1 0.22 30.40 
 Malaysia 2 0.44   5.19 
  Total 450 100 19.54 
 
Note: Economic categories of the nations are based on IMF advanced economies 
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Table 2.2. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations (N=450). 
 
  Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Premium (%) 19.536 57.498 1 
             
2 SOE 0.109 0.312 0.083* 1 
            
3 Acquirer SOE 0.044 0.206 0.072 0.617* 1 
           
4 Parent SOE 0.064 0.246 0.045 0.751* -0.057 1 
          
5 HK 0.536 0.499 -0.170* 0.039 -0.080* 0.117* 1 
         
6 
Strategic 
Industry 
0.213 0.410 0.085* 0.010 0.072 -0.048 -0.298* 1 
        
7 Closeness 0.362 0.481 0.015 0.004 0.017 -0.010 0.007 -0.009 1 
       
8 
Competing 
Bidder 
0.027 0.161 0.122* -0.014 0.031 -0.043 -0.150* 0.015 0.019 1 
      
9 Same Nation 0.364 0.482 -0.071 0.047 -0.141* 0.177* 0.298* -0.180* 0.150* -0.097* 1 
     
10 Friendly 0.771 0.421 0.060 -0.013 0.066 -0.072 -0.242* 0.090* -0.250* -0.008 -0.280* 1 
    
11 
Transaction 
Value (log) 
6.562 0.847 0.064 0.016 0.032 -0.006 0.057 0.103* -0.016 -0.005 -0.058 -0.063 1 
   
12 
Target Total 
Assets (log) 
5.560 0.892 0.015 0.048 0.048 0.021 0.060 -0.009 -0.100** 0.027 -0.052 0.015 0.084* 1 
  
13 
Target Book 
Value (log) 
29.242 24.801 -0.014 -0.013 0.073 -0.078* -0.206* -0.027 0.082 0.020 -0.092* -0.002 -0.035 -0.063 1 
 
14 
Target 
Market-to-
Book Ratio 
0.263 3.616 -0.094* -0.021 -0.013 -0.016 0.039 -0.025 -0.039 0.002 -0.031 0.015 0.014 0.000 -0.005 1 
  
Correlation is significant at * p < 0.10. 
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Table 2.3. Effect of State-Ownership in Either Acquirer or Parent (H1). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Industry fixed 
effects 
Country fixed 
effects 
Industry & country 
fixed effects 
SOE 49.47** 51.60** 49.02** 
 
(19.45) (19.43) (19.33) 
SOE*HK -60.78*** -58.00*** -56.60** 
 
(21.53) (21.69) (22.30) 
Strategic Industry 6.701*** 0.0774 6.509*** 
 
(1.814) (3.969) (1.965) 
Closeness 3.819 2.143 3.001 
 
(6.011) (4.807) (5.137) 
Competing Bidder 39.18*** 30.00*** 33.08*** 
 
(6.334) (7.477) (7.755) 
Same Nation -3.550 0.314 -3.307 
 
(8.258) (6.738) (7.981) 
Friendly 9.012 2.613 6.557 
 
(5.759) (5.546) (6.997) 
Transaction Value (log) 4.961 4.043 5.078 
 
(3.571) (3.266) (3.496) 
Target Total Assets (log) 0.527 0.973 1.429 
 
(5.108) (4.023) (5.030) 
Target Book Value -0.172 -0.295 -0.513 
 
(0.145) (0.204) (0.310) 
Target Market-to-Book Ratio -1.481*** -1.416*** -1.390*** 
 
(0.124) (0.118) (0.145) 
Constant 16.48 17.23 -23.52 
 
(46.57) (52.35) (57.38) 
Time  fixed effects YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES No YES 
Country fixed effects No YES YES 
N 450 450 450 
r2 0.186 0.145 0.225 
 
The dependent variable is the four weeks premium. The heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, 
clustered at the SIC2 industry level are reported in parenthesis. Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2.4. Effect of State-Owned Parent with Private Acquirer (H2). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Industry fixed 
effects 
Country fixed 
effects 
Industry & country 
fixed effects 
Acquirer SOE 39.89** 41.74*** 38.15*** 
 
(15.46) (15.06) (14.14) 
Parent SOE 63.49** 64.96** 63.07** 
 
(29.11) (29.12) (29.25) 
SOE*HK -69.03*** -65.34** -64.58** 
 
(25.12) (25.10) (25.95) 
Strategic Industry 8.162*** 0.496 8.082*** 
 
(2.218) (4.012) (2.311) 
Closeness 4.336 2.449 3.615 
 
(5.813) (4.645) (4.940) 
Competing Bidder 40.08*** 31.35*** 34.49*** 
 
(6.802) (8.100) (8.147) 
Same Nation -5.011 -1.207 -4.955 
 
(8.893) (6.915) (8.569) 
Friendly 9.612* 2.996 7.219 
 
(5.657) (5.504) (6.895) 
Transaction Value (log) 5.009 4.103 5.158 
 
(3.613) (3.302) (3.538) 
Target Total Assets (log) 0.507 0.985 1.329 
 
(5.203) (4.045) (5.167) 
Target Book Value -0.175 -0.292 -0.517 
 
(0.145) (0.202) (0.309) 
Target Market-to-Book Ratio -1.485*** -1.429*** -1.399*** 
 
(0.125) (0.116) (0.145) 
Constant 15.24 15.55 -22.77 
 
(46.18) (51.56) (58.44) 
Time  fixed effects YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES No YES 
Country fixed effects No YES YES 
N 450 450 450 
r2 0.189 0.148 0.228 
 
The dependent variable is the four weeks premium. The heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, 
clustered at the SIC2 industry level are reported in parenthesis. Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 2: EMERGING-MARKET ACQUIRERS’ PRODUCTIVITY GAINS VIA 
CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE 
ACQUIRERS 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, many emerging-markets have liberalized their economic policies from 
inward-looking to outward-looking ones. As a result, emerging-market multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) are increasingly stepping out of their national boundaries and actively engaging in 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Narula & Dunning, 2000). One important rationale 
behind emerging-market MNEs’ rapid internationalization is to learn from these international 
experiences and develop international competitiveness (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2008b). 
For example, the Chinese central government established the ‘Go Global’ policy in 1999 to urge 
mainland firms to invest in overseas operations (Buckley et al., 2007). As a result, government 
controls over outward FDI have been loosened and preferential treatments such as direct grants, 
tax benefits, low- or no-interest loans and access to foreign exchange have been provided to 
Chinese firms investing abroad (Gu & Reed, 2013). The ultimate goal of this policy is to 
encourage Chinese indigenous firms to acquire the necessary advanced technologies, knowledge, 
and management skills and learn from overseas so that they can cope with the intense 
competition against foreign rivals both domestically and globally. Such dynamics are not 
exclusive to China. In the case of India, the supports by the state and its public policies, and the 
knowledge-seeking perspective have been crucial factors in the rise of Indian MNEs (Taylor & 
Nölke, 2010).  
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Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become the preferred vehicle for 
emerging-market MNEs’ outward FDI especially in the triad region (U.S., Western Europe, 
Japan/Australia) (Sauvant, Maschek, & McAllister, 2009). Emerging-market acquirers have 
impressed the world with a number of high-profile cross-border M&As such as the $1.25 billion 
acquisition of IBM’s PC division by Chinese Lenovo in 2005, the $7.6 billion acquisition of UK-
based Corus Group by Indian Tata Steel in 2006, and the $4.7 billion acquisition of US 
Smithfield by Chinese Shuanghui in 2013. According to Maucher (1998), M&A can be an 
important and efficient strategic instrument for enhancing the competitiveness of a company. It 
represents a learning opportunity where knowledge transfer and learning occurs in order to 
achieve synergy (Greenberg, Lane, & Bahde, 2005). Yet, received wisdom suggests that from an 
acquirer’s perspective, most M&As fail (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Lubatkin, 1983; Morck, 
Schleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Pfeffer, 2007), in the sense that they do not increase shareholder 
value or profitability, or generate the anticipated financial goals. The reason is that the 
acquisition process consists of many interdependent sub-activities, such as due diligence, 
negotiation, financing, and integration, each of which is complex in itself (Hitt et al., 2001). Due 
to emerging-market acquirers’ competitive disadvantage in advanced knowledge and the 
complexities involved in various international settings, the knowledge transfer and learning may 
not be effective to achieve value creation and synergy subsequent to M&As. Therefore it is not 
clear that emerging-market MNEs are able to learn from outward cross-border M&A activities.  
  Accordingly, this essay examines whether emerging-market acquirers’ learn from 
foreign targets and thereby upgrade their productivity at home subsequent to cross-border M&A 
activities. Building on the perspectives of asset exploration, absorptive capacity, and knowledge 
transfer in multinationals, I submit that emerging-market acquirers are able to assimilate the 
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learning from foreign targets back home and increase their domestic productivity. Cross-border 
M&As are a vehicle for the emerging-market MNEs to obtain the needed strategic assets abroad 
which they cannot develop internally (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Hitt et al., 2005; Li, 2010). 
Emerging-market firms have benefited tremendously from inward FDI. Global investors have 
not only increased the level of emerging-market domestic competition, but also transferred their 
technological and organizational skills via decades of cooperation and competition with the 
indigenous firms. This ‘spillover effect’ enables the emerging-market acquirers to absorb the 
strategic assets acquired from foreign targets and develop their own capabilities. To most 
emerging-market MNEs, their home markets have been increasingly penetrated and even 
dominated by developed-nation MNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007). This increased domestic 
competition forces emerging-market firms to upgrade their domestic operation in order to 
survive. For MNEs, in spite of being global, there remains a strong association between their 
activities and the home country’s innovation system (Narula, 2006). Emerging-market MNEs 
acquire foreign firms in order to connect sophisticated technologies and brands with low costs 
and relatively high growth rates at home (Kumar, 2009). Since MNEs are social communities 
that specialize in the creation and internal transfer of knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993), it is 
likely that emerging-market acquirers will transfer the knowledge acquired from overseas back 
home subsequent to the cross-border M&A activities in order to enhance their domestic 
capabilities and compete more effectively against foreign entrants in the home market. 
Traditional theories need refinement and extension in order to incorporate the distinct 
patterns of emerging-market MNEs outward FDI in the 2000s (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012). Existing research is largely based on evidence from developed 
nations and thus may not be generalizable in the context of emerging-markets. For example, the 
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series of aggressive, and risky outward M&As undertaken by emerging-market MNEs suggest 
that these firms have been able to internationalize rapidly (Contractor, Kumar, & Kundu, 2007; 
Mathews, 2006; Mathews & Zander, 2007) and not in an incremental manner as predicted by 
Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) conventional internationalization process theory9. Similarly, early 
research has identified that MNEs conduct cross-border M&As in order to ‘exploit’ their existing 
competitive advantages (Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1981; Lecraw, 1993). It follows a 
traditional approach which considers the headquarters as the center of innovation while 
overlooking the capability of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Thus existing studies 
on learning between the acquirer and the target tend to employ a “top-down” approach which 
looks at the impact of M&A on foreign targets or host country since the acquirer is often 
perceived as superior in capability as compared to the target and local firms in the host country. 
However, the often-stated motive behind emerging-markets’ cross-border investments is to 
explore strategic assets abroad in order to compensate for their competitive disadvantages 
(Mathews, 2006; Luo & Tung, 2007). In the case of emerging-market cross-border M&As, 
foreign targets often possess superior capabilities as compared to the acquirer - especially when 
it is a developed-nation target. Therefore, a ‘bottom-up’ knowledge transfer happens from the 
developed-nation target to the emerging-market acquirer (i.e., the “reverse spillover effect”). 
However, to my knowledge no study has been conducted on whether and how this reverse 
spillover affects emerging-market acquirers’ home operations. In light of these incongruences 
with the existing literature, our view towards firms’ internationalization needs to be updated 
accordingly to incorporate the patterns of emerging-market acquirers’ learning and capability 
development via cross-border M&A activities. 
                                                 
9 Internationalization process theory concludes that firms often develop their international operations in small steps (e.g., from 
starting exporting to a country, to establishing export channels, to setting up a selling subsidiary in the host country), rather than 
by making large foreign production investments at single points in time (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
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Although the M&A literature is large, only a relatively small subset has focused on 
organizational learning (Barkema & Schijven, 2008) and much of this organizational learning 
literature is confined to learning via domestic M&As. Many studies in the organizational 
learning literature have examined the impact of acquisitions on firm performance and the results 
are mixed: positive effects (e.g., Barkema, et al., 1996; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001), no effects 
(e.g., Baum & Ginsberg, 1997; Zollo & Singh, 2004), and U-shaped relationships (e.g., 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Reuer, 2006) are established. Scholars tend to examine 
acquirer’s post-M&A performance with value creation (measured by stock market abnormal 
return in event study) (e.g., Dewenter, 1995; Harrison et al., 1991; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; 
Morck & Yeung, 1992; Servaes, 1991; Boateng, Qian, & Tianle, 2008; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010). Other research studies have considered 
accounting-based profits such as sales growth (e.g., Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998; Vermeulen 
& Barkema, 2001), return on sales (e.g., Lee & Caves, 1998), and financial premiums (e.g., 
Beckman & Haunschild, 2002) or survival of the acquisition (e.g., Schijven & Barkema, 2007; 
Hébert, Very, & Beamish, 2005). Although stock prices and accounting profits are useful 
performance indicators, they are imperfect measures of organizational efficiency and learning 
(Siegel & Simons, 2010). Brouthers, van Hastenburg, and van den Ven (1998) suggest that 
researchers have been using incorrect measures of merger performance, and this may account for 
the negative findings. A potential better measure of acquisition performance is not an arbitrary 
economic measure of profitability or shareholder value
10
, but is the achievement of the original 
objectives of the acquisition. Since one important motive behind emerging-market M&As is to 
                                                 
10 It could well be the case that acquirer’s accounting-based performance decreases while at the same time its home productivity 
increases after the cross-border M&A. 
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learn from overseas, measuring productivity provides a much tighter and intuitive link between 
cross-border M&As and the subsequent learning. 
Accordingly, I empirically examine emerging-market acquirers’ domestic productivity 
gains in the years subsequent to cross-border M&A activities. Based on data for 578 cross-border 
M&As by 266 Chinese acquirers over 2000-2011, I find that: (1) Cross-border M&A activities in 
the prior two to four years is positively related to the Chinese acquirer’s total factor productivity 
(TFP) in its domestic operations, suggesting that acquirers learn and enhance their capabilities 
via the acquisition of foreign targets. (2) This home productivity increase stems from acquiring 
developed-nation targets as opposed to developing-nation targets. (3) Cross-border M&As are 
superior vehicles to engage in learning as compared to international alliances. These findings 
suggest that Chinese acquirers are able to learn and enhance their capabilities via cross-border 
M&A activities, suggesting that the Chinese government’s ‘Go Global’ policy has been 
generally successful. 
This study contributes to the existing International Business and Strategy literature by 
identifying the process and outcome of Chinese acquirers’ internationalization. That is, Chinese 
acquirers pursue cross-border M&As as a way to learn from developed-nation targets. They are 
able to assimilate the learning and take the knowledge back home in order to upgrade their 
domestic productivity and compete more effectively at home. I provide corroborative empirical 
evidence to support the claim in Luo and Tung (2007) that emerging-market MNEs exploit their 
existing competitive advantages in other emerging-markets while exploring strategic assets in 
developed nations. It also extends traditional wisdom on firms’ internationalization by 
demonstrating that rather than accumulating knowledge via incremental expansion, emerging-
market MNEs can be successful via accelerated internationalization. The increase in emerging-
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market acquirer’s domestic productivity subsequent to the cross-border M&As implies that the 
“reverse knowledge spillover” mechanism is evident from the developed-nation targets to the 
emerging-market acquirer.  
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows: The next section 
develops the theoretical foundation and generates the hypotheses. The third section outlines the 
empirical design and presents empirical results. The fourth section concludes with discussion and 
outlines potential future research.   
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Cross-border M&As Lead to Domestic Productivity Upgrading 
The Need to Learn 
With growing population and cheap labor costs, emerging-markets have been a very attractive 
place for developed-nation MNEs to expand their market territory and reduce production costs.  
A large number of powerful global MNEs from developed-nation MNEs entered emerging-
markets to set up production facilities, form alliances with indigenous firms, and penetrate local 
markets. On one hand, internationalization helps raise the bar of local standards and brings 
advanced knowhow to the emerging-markets. On the other, their competitive advantage in 
product quality, production technology, and management expertise have taken up much of the 
local sales and thus made the survival of local firms even tougher. Rising capacity and 
intensifying domestic price competition are cutting profit margins of the emerging-market firms 
(Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). According to Rugman (2010), emerging-market firms are strong 
in country-specific advantages but weak in firm-specific advantages. Quick changes in 
technological and market landscapes and an increasingly borderless world economy give no time 
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for emerging-market firms to develop organically by their own or internationalize incrementally. 
Emerging-market MNEs need to develop firm-specific advantages across a network of foreign 
affiliates. Consequently, emerging-market MNEs are pushed out to internationalize rapidly, 
seeking external markets and develop capabilities from acquiring abroad (Sauvant, Maschek, & 
McAllister, 2009).  
Emerging-market firms are proactive in international expansion as a result of home 
country liberalization and the government’s support. In China, the “Go Global” policy has 
encouraged and supported many Chinese indigenous firms stepping out of national borders in 
order to seek knowledge and develop capabilities abroad. Since 2000, Indian companies have 
been able to make overseas investments by purchases of foreign exchange without prior approval 
of the Reserve Bank of India. Under the current economic condition, many emerging-market 
MNEs have taken the chance to acquire the declining value of overseas strategic assets in a large 
scale with the willingness of global players to share or sell their strategic resources. 
The domestic demand in emerging-markets is large and it requires firm’s synchronous 
growth in production capability to meet the increasing needs. Cross-border M&A becomes as a 
way for emerging-market acquirers to secure strategic natural resources (e.g., oil and gas, metals), 
obtain advanced technology and related brand equity, and gain access to consumers in key 
foreign markets (Chari, Chen, & Dominguez, 2012) (i.e., the “asset exploration” perspective, 
(March, 1991)). Indian cross-border M&As have also focused on technology intensive sectors in 
the US, suggesting a learning motive behind these deals. Shuanghui, the biggest pork producer in 
China, acquired Smithfield, the world's largest pork producer, in 2013 with the hope that this 
acquisition will enable Shuanghui to learn from Smithfield’s food safety and production 
technology. To emerging-market firms, acquisition of the needed resources abroad provides a 
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faster alternative to consummate their resource portfolio. The majority of Chinese cross-border 
M&As are acquisitions of manufacturing and natural resource industry in the most advanced 
nations such as US, Japan, UK, Canada, and Australia
11
.  
 
Necessary Condition: Absorptive Capacity 
Through inward FDI, emerging-market firms have accumulated considerable financial and 
operational assets, upgraded technological and process management skills, and developed unique 
capabilities and learning experiences (Young et al., 1996). According to Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990: 128), ‘a firm's absorptive capacity is largely a function of the firm's level of prior related 
knowledge. The premise of the notion of absorptive capacity is that the organization needs prior 
related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge. Inward FDI has provided emerging-
market firms with the necessary prior related knowledge to develop absorptive capacity, which 
enables firms to assimilate external knowledge more efficiently (Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005; 
Song & Shin, 2008).  
Many emerging-market MNEs such as Lenovo, Haier, and Infosys are national leaders at 
home. According to Aghion et al. (2004), the threat of technologically advanced entry spurs 
innovation incentives in firms close to the technology frontier, but discourages innovation in 
laggard firms. In this vein, the entry of global players from developed nations will incentivize 
emerging-market MNEs to thrive and catch up with the world leaders at the technology frontier. 
For example, Lenovo and Huawei are excellent cases that spent large sums to purchase and adopt 
world-class management systems. In 1999, Lenovo copied HP’s dealer distribution system, but 
at the same time this system was improved by Lenovo’s combining it with fast, responsive, and 
nationwide customer services (Rui, Yip, & Prashantham, 2010). Similarly, Huawei applied 
                                                 
11 Information is based on my data in this study. Refer to Table 3 for details. 
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IBM’s IPD system to reform Huawei’s product-development model, shorten the production time, 
reduce costs, and improve quality (Cheng & Liu, 2006: 246). These Chinese firms are national 
leaders possessing the necessary absorptive capacities to assimilate the knowledge acquired from 
foreign firms. Therefore, emerging-market acquirers are likely to be able to leverage the learning 
from aboard into their own capability development.  
 
The Integration Practice Conducive to Learning 
Management integration between the emerging-market acquirer and the foreign targets is a 
critical factor conducive to learning subsequent to the cross-border M&As.  
Emerging-market acquirers have a long-run goal of enhancing their overall skillset and 
knowledge base via cross-border M&A activities. Unlike western acquirers who tend to pull the 
target firm close as quickly as possible to create immediate synergies or obtain instant growth 
(which often means the reassigning of roles, the shedding of TMT jobs, and turnover in TMT 
jobs), emerging-market acquirers tend to synergize the acquisition and integrate with the target 
smoothly especially in recent years. Departing from the conventional wisdom of control, which 
suggests that required managerial control by the firm's senior expatriates must increase with 
resource commitment (Hennart, 1989) and with more risky entry mode (Hill et al., 1990), 
emerging-market acquirers tend to keep target management structure and people after cross-
border M&As (Kumar, 2009) rather than use expatriates from home to organize complex 
operations in advanced markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). Retention of managers is a virtual 
prerequisite to capturing learning (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). Emerging-market corporate 
management is still in transition from their old model to modern practice, such that their post-
M&A management displays complexity characterized by a tremendous range of governance 
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forms including family-owned firms, business groups, and state ownership (Delios, 2011). 
Therefore, smooth integration and keeping the target management could help acquirers obtain, 
accumulate, and leverage management know-how and best practices to achieve learning via 
acquisition (Hébert, Very, & Beamish, 2005).  
 
MNE, Knowledge Transfer, and Domestic Productivity Upgrading  
MNEs are social communities that specialize in the creation and internal transfer of knowledge 
(Kogut & Zander, 1993). There are complex interdependencies between economic actors in 
many given locations. Firm-specific advantages are developed and diffused within the MNE 
network (Dunning, 1958; Hymer, 1976; Vernon, 1966). Thus, knowledge and capabilities within 
MNEs is transferred or disseminated from the center of excellence (i.e., the organizational unit 
that embodies a set of capabilities recognized by the firm as an important source of value 
creation) to other parts of the firm (Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002). This ability to create and 
transfer knowledge is perceived as a key competitive advantage of MNEs (Andersson, Forsgren, 
& Holm, 2001). Although the initial costs of emerging-market cross-border M&A may be 
relatively high, MNEs could expand their knowledge base and improve the overall competitive 
advantage of the organization (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Therefore, learning and 
knowledge transfer is likely to happen within an emerging-market MNE’s network via cross-
border M&As. 
Emerging-market outward FDI is important to the home countries involved (Ramamurti, 
2008a). The springboard view (Luo & Tung, 2007) considers the home country as a supply or 
production base to meet emerging-market MNE’s increased global sales for high-end products. 
In contrast, I consider that emerging-market MNE’s internationalization may serve as a way to 
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enhance MNE’s operation at the home country. According to Bertrand and Capron (2014), cross-
border acquisitions can enhance the acquirers’ domestic productivity, especially when there are 
learning opportunities in the target’s host country and when contemporaneous domestic 
productivity-enhancing investments are made by the acquirer in conjunction with the acquisition. 
To most emerging-market MNEs, their home country markets are still their primary territory of 
operation and main market battlefield. Therefore I posit that rather than keeping the learning 
from abroad within foreign subsidiaries, emerging-market acquirers may transfer their learning 
back home in order to develop domestic capabilities and competitiveness against foreign rivals at 
home (i.e. the ‘reverse’ spillover effect from the target to the acquirer (Hakanson & Nobel, 2000; 
Song & Shin, 2008)). Foreign target in this case serves as a resource pool to provide the needed 
assets to the emerging-market acquirers. It is the base for the acquirer’s generations of strategic 
assets, which can be leveraged throughout the MNE in multiple locations. Many Chinese MNEs 
like Haier did not transfer their assets in the domestic market abroad after the international 
expansion but transferred their international competitive assets back to China (Du, 2003). In this 
vein, it becomes more pertinent to examine emerging-market acquirers’ learning through the lens 
of domestic productivity. We will likely find emerging-market acquirers transfer their learning 
from overseas back home to upgrade their domestic productivity. Therefore hypothesis (1) is 
proposed, 
 
H(1): Cross-border M&A activities lead to higher domestic productivity for emerging-
market acquirers in subsequent years.  
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Learning from Developing or Developed-nation Targets 
Emerging-market firms use international expansion to exploit their competitive advantages, 
especially when emerging-market firms enter other less-developed nations (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
Past literature has identified that developed-nation MNEs generally leverage and exploit their 
ownership-specific competitive advantages in foreign countries (Dunning, 1981; Lecraw, 1993). 
Likewise, when investing in less-developed nations, emerging-market MNEs act more like a 
developed-nation firm in the host nation. According to Luo and Tung (2007), emerging-market 
firms invest in less developed nations in order to (1) bypass trade barriers into advanced markets 
(e.g., some Chinese textile and clothing companies invested in Turkey as a springboard to 
increase exports to the EU, Fiji as a gateway to Australia and New Zealand, and Jamaica as a 
platform to increase US sales); (2) seize opportunities in other developing countries to leverage 
their cost-effective manufacturing capabilities (e.g., many Chinese companies invested in 
southeast Asia to absorb their excess production capacity); and (3) leverage their low-cost 
advantage from their domestic operations in the foreign market. Many Chinese MNEs are 
national leaders in their respective industries at home. The technology they gained over the past 
decades, together with their mass production capabilities and experiences, have spurred 
emerging-market MNEs to manufacture technologically standardized products in other 
emerging-markets (Yeung, 1997). Kumar (2009) points out that big emerging-market acquirers 
are able to turn slow-growing companies with low margins into fast-growing, high-margin 
enterprises (the logic of “reverse” M&A), as they can simply transform an acquisition’s 
economics by switching to the low-cost resources and business processes in the home country. 
By acquiring targets in another emerging-market nation, they are able to gain access to the 
foreign consumers and exploit their manufacturing capabilities together with the utilization of 
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their cost advantages at home, and thus become a world “production hub”. As suggested by 
Akbari (2013), emerging-market firms that become embedded in developed nations experience 
negative financial performance in the short run but realize positive financial performance in the 
long run. 
In contrast, emerging-market acquirers tend to pursue cross-border M&As to explore the 
strategic assets when they invest in developed nations. According to the Luo and Tung (2007)’s 
“springboard perspective”, emerging-market MNEs use international expansion as a springboard 
to compensate for their competitive disadvantages in developed nations. They “seek 
sophisticated technology or advanced manufacturing know-how by acquiring foreign companies 
or their subunits that possess such proprietary technology” (Luo & Tung, 2007: 485) in order to 
fill their resource void. In recent decades, emerging-market firms have become relatively cash 
rich owing to their large amount of exports. In current economic conditions, many developed-
nation firms are willing to sell or share their strategic assets due to financial exigency or 
restructuring (Child & Rodrigues, 2005), which makes emerging-market MNE’s purchase of the 
developed-nation targets even more attractive. Therefore, emerging-market acquirers’ 
productivity increase will stem from the acquisition of developed-nation targets as opposed to 
developing-nation targets. 
 
H(2): Cross-border M&A activities lead to higher domestic productivity for emerging-
market acquirers in subsequent years when the target is located in a developed 
nation as compared to a developing nation.  
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Learning from International Alliances or Cross-border M&As 
Cross-border M&As are not the only vehicle via which Chinese firms may be learning from 
abroad. A striking feature of recent Chinese cross-border M&As is that many Chinese acquirers 
had previously formed international alliances (Rui, Yip, & Prashantham, 2010).  
Chinese government tends to encourage domestic firms’ learning from international 
alliance partners. There was once a policy to enforce such learning by mandating foreign 
investors to form alliance with local firms as a precondition for their entry into emerging-markets. 
However, a striking problem in partnership is that many firms with superior technology are 
reluctant to transfer their superior technology to their partners (Rui, Yip, & Prashanthm, 2010). 
Alliance partners may be competitive, as well as collaborative (Hamel, 1991). According to Kale 
and Singh (2007), the effect of the alliance function on performance is mediated by processes 
that help firms acquire, accumulate, and leverage alliance management know-how and best 
practices. Since a firm is conceived as a portfolio of core competencies, the acquisition of skills 
between alliance partners becomes an essential concern in inter-firm competition. In the presence 
of different interests of the two partners, the process of learning will be hindered by shirking and 
opportunistic behavior, which prevents valuable information sharing and cooperation between 
international alliance partners. Structures and mechanisms may be preset before the formation of 
alliance to protect the competitive advantage of individual alliance partner. However, as alliances 
are not vertical integration per se, it is hard to control and monitor shirking and opportunistic 
behavior. In this vein, information transparency and free knowledge flow among alliance 
partners cannot be perfectly achieved. This issue manifests particularly in non-equity alliances 
where partners rarely pool their resources and efforts in cooperative agreements in the way that 
they do when using joint ventures (Harrigan, 1985 & 1986; Kogut, 1988).  
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In contrast, acquisition is a preferred way of learning since it “may broaden a firm’s 
knowledge base and decrease inertia” (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001: 457). Firms’ desires to 
realize synergies have been found to be the predominant explanation for cross-border acquisition 
(Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000). Compared to alliances, M&As enable a firm to buy not only 
tangible, but also intangible, assets such as brands, local market knowledge, and relationships 
(Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga, 1996; Chi & Seth, 2009). As pointed out by earlier studies (Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972; Demsetz, 1988; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Gulati & Singh, 1998), 
the greater the potential concerns of appropriation between parties, the more hierarchical the 
contract should be to assure aligning incentives. Transaction Cost theory suggests that vertical 
integration attenuates the incentives for opportunistic behavior (Armour & Teece, 1980; Hennart, 
1977, 1982; Mahoney & Qian, 2013; Rugman, 1981; Williamson, 1975, 1985). The authority 
relationship in vertical integration leads to more effective coordination and thus better learning 
than those of alliances. In the case of M&As, organizational members are more likely to engage 
in knowledge transfer activities when they could connected to organizational members from the 
merging firm (Greenberg, Lane, & Bahde, 2005). In addition, language coding is formed in a 
more straightforward way rather than to hide and obfuscate information under the case of vertical 
integration (Mahoney, 2001; Williamson, 1975). Compared to the acquirer and target in M&As, 
partners among alliance are relatively loosely connected with each other, whereas the divisions 
of a merged firm no longer have preemptive claims on the profits that are the case when the 
managers are in separate firms. Because acquirer and target are essentially in a single entity 
chasing after the same goal, their incentives are more aligned compared to alliances. These 
aligned incentives for cooperation of the merged firms will facilitate knowledge assimilation via 
M&As, which will subsequently result in acquirer’s higher productivity.  
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H(3): Cross-border M&A activities by emerging-market acquirers lead to higher 
domestic productivity increases in subsequent years as compared to international 
alliance experiences. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Data for this essay were compiled and matched from three different sources: Thomson SDC 
Platinum database (for data on global M&As and alliances), Compustat Global database (for data 
on Chinese firm’s balance sheets), and China RESSET database (for data on domestic sales and 
number of employees of Chinese publicly listed firms). First, I manually matched SDC and 
RESSET in order to identify the Chinese publicly listed firms which have cross-border M&As. 
Second, I manually matched Compustat Global with SDC in order to capture the accounting-
based information of these Chinese publicly listed firms (i.e., capital and materials). Third, I 
matched these firms with their domestic M&As, domestic alliances, and international alliances in 
SDC database. Last, I merged the above three matched databases into the final dataset. The final 
data is panel in nature and is composed of 266 Chinese acquirers with 578 cross-border M&As 
over 2000-2011.  
Table 3.1 & 3.2 describe the Chinese cross-border M&As by industry and by target 
nation
12
 respectively. Table 3.1 shows that the majority of Chinese cross-border M&As over 
2000-2011 are in the manufacturing (35.12%) and natural resources (34.78%) industries. 
Consistent with emerging-market acquirer’s learning perspective, Chinese MNEs mostly 
acquired developed-nation targets (48.8%) and targets in newly industrialized nations (31.5%) as 
                                                 
12 I follow the IMF list to categorize developed and developing nations. Target locations are categorized into two groups. Cross-
border M&As are considered as M&As of developed-nation target if the target is located in Australia, Japan, New Zealand, 
Canada, United States, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Belgium, British Virgin, 
Cayman Islands, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan. Cross-border M&As 
are considered as M&As of developing-nation target if the target is located in other countries. 
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shown in Table 3.2. That is, acquisitions of targets in relatively more developed-nations 
(compared to China) take up 80.3% of Chinese MNEs’ total cross-border M&As. Moreover, the 
cross-border M&As of developed-nation targets tends to concentrate on the world most advanced 
nations such as US, UK, Canada, and Japan
13
. In contrast, acquisitions of developing-nation 
targets take up only 19.7% of the total cross-border M&As. And these acquisitions tend to 
distribute evenly across developing-nations. Figure 2.1 depicts the trend of Chinese cross-border 
M&As of US targets by industry. It shows that the majority of the acquisitions of US targets are 
in the manufacturing industry. Figure 2.1 also displays a rapid increase in Chinese cross-border 
M&As of the US targets after 2009. It implies that under the current economic conditions, 
developed nations have become a much more attractive place to invest in with reduced 
competition and sophisticated technologies. Chinese acquirers tend to capitalize on the declining 
asset values in developed nations and internationalize rapidly in an unprecedented manner. 
The dependent variable is the log of the firm’s domestic sales. The focal explanatory 
variable is firm’s cross-border M&As and international alliances. The other three explanatory 
variables - capital, labor, and materials - provide a means to assess firm’s total factor 
productivity (TFP) (Javorcik, 2004; Siegel & Simons, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). TFP is the 
residual in productivity
14
 that is not explained by the production inputs (i.e., labor, capital, and 
materials). Although the dependent variable in the model is log of sales, the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables essentially capture the effects on TFP since the effects of production inputs 
on sales are captured on the right hand of the equation. Other independent variables include 
firm’s domestic M&As, domestic alliances, lagged sales, and year dummies. Firm’s domestic 
                                                 
13 Most acquisitions of US and Japan targets are in manufacturing industry. Most acquisitions of UK, Canada, and Australia 
targets are in natural resource industry. Please refer to Table 3.3 for detailed description of target industry for Chinese cross-
border M&As in most concentrated nations. 
14 Productivity is the ratio of output to inputs in production, measured by the value of output (sales) divided by the value of 
production inputs (labor, capital, and materials). 
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alliances are used to control for firm’s potential learning via domestic alliance activities. 
Similarly, firm’s domestic M&As are controlled for to exclude the potential learning via 
domestic M&A activities. As pointed out by Lei, Hitt, and Bettis (1996), learning from prior 
experiences may be crucial in attempting to enhance the performance of acquisitions. Given that 
absorptive capacity is one form of a firm's learning capability, it is expected that the level of 
absorptive capacity that the firm possesses would be closely associated with the amount of prior 
experiences that the firm has in acquiring strategic assets from other firms (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 
2002). Hence, domestic M&As and alliance activities may as well contribute to firm’s learning 
and absorptive capacity besides international alliances and cross-border M&As. Table 3.4 
provides a detailed description of the variable names and the measurements. Variable 
correlations are presented in Table 3.5.  
Following the approach in Siegel and Simons (2010), I specify model 1 as, 
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Where   captures the effect of cross-border M&A activities in the previous year t-m to year t-n 
on firm’s TFP in the current year t (t>  ). ∑                   
   
      denotes the sum of 
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firm’s yearly number of M&As from year t-m to year t-n. I sum up the lagged number of cross-
border M&As to capture learning via cross-border M&As. Since learning takes time, learning 
will not lead to productivity gains contemporaneously. In addition, according to Ahuja and 
Katila (2001), the impact of an acquisition is likely to be felt over a number of years, rather than 
entirely in any one year. Thus the total impact of an acquisition may be statistically 
inconsequential in any one year and the regression coefficients on the lagged cross-border 
M&As can be summed to obtain the total impact of an acquisition across time (Gujarati, 1988). 
Similarly, ∑              
   
     , ∑                        
   
     , and 
∑                   
   
      captures the cumulative sum of a firm’s yearly count of domestic 
M&A, domestic alliance, and international alliance experiences respectively from year t-m to 
year t-n. I expect to find a positive and significant   in model 1.  
I employ a dynamic panel data method to estimate the above two models. The lagged 
dependent variables are included as independent variables to estimate the appropriate coefficient 
estimates in light of the presence of autoregressive dynamics (Finkel, 1995) and to address the 
omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002). To capture the total lagged cross-border M&As across 
time, the two-year, three-year, and four-year lagged number of cross-border M&As were 
summed as the focal explanatory variable in the model. Illustratively speaking, the acquirer’s 
domestic productivity in 2009 is potentially influenced by acquisitions made in 2007, 2006, and 
2005. The first-year lagged number of cross-border M&As was not included in the model since 
emerging-market acquirers tend to undertake initial restructuring of the target firms (Chari, Chen, 
& Dominguez, 2012) thus the learning effect does not likely manifest as quickly as in the first 
post-acquisition year. An explorative test based on Clougherty and Zhang (2009) of the effect of 
the first-year lagged number of cross-border M&As on acquirer’s productivity confirms this 
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conjecture. In sensitivity tests (results available from the author), instead of using the two 
through four year lagged number of cross-border M&As, I also estimated the model using lags 
that involve five years and more, and found results are substantively identical to those employing 
three year lags, meaning that the learning is completely assimilated after year five and beyond 
following the cross-border M&As. The use of lagged number of cross-border M&As enables us 
to examine the time pattern of the impact of cross-border M&As on acquirer’s productivity. For 
instance, if a cross-border M&A contributes to an acquirer’s domestic productivity for the first 2 
years but thereafter leads to no further productivity gains, the 1- and 2-year lagged acquisition 
variables will be positive and significant, while the 3- and 4-year lagged acquisition variables 
will be non-significant.  
To examine whether the acquirer’s productivity gains stem from acquiring developed-
nation or developing-nation target, I split the sum of firm’s yearly number of cross-border 
M&As into two explanatory variables according to the target nation: sum of cross-border M&As 
of developed-nation targets and sum of cross-border M&As of developing-nation targets
15
. 
Model 2 is specified as below, 
 
                                                 
15 Refer to Table 3.2 for categories of developed nation and developing nation based on IMF list. I group newly industrialized 
nations into developed nations for empirical analysis since they are generally considered as more developed economy than China.  
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Fixed effect estimation with robust errors is first employed. Results from fixed effect 
estimations are displayed in model 1(a) and 2(a) in Table 3.6. In the regression table, Sum(Cross-
border M&A_2-4) is the sum of yearly M&As in the prior two to four years. Similarly, 
Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4), Sum(international Alliance_2-4), and Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4) 
denote the sum of yearly domestic M&As, international alliances, and domestic alliances 
respectively in the prior two to four years. Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4)_Developed-nation 
Target and Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4)_Developing-nation Target represent respectively the 
sum of yearly cross-border M&As of the developed-nation targets and developing-nation targets 
respectively in the prior two to four years. Model 1(a) shows that the sum of cross-border M&As 
in the prior two to four years is significantly and positively related to acquirer’s domestic 
productivity. Therefore, H1 is supported that emerging-market acquirers are able to learn and 
upgrade their domestic productivity via cross-border M&As.  In contrast, we see in Model 1(a) 
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that the sum of international alliances in the prior two to four years are not significant, 
suggesting cross-border M&A is a relatively superior vehicle for Chinese acquirers to learn from 
abroad as compared to international alliance. Model 2(a) shows that this productivity increase 
only stems from acquisitions of developed-nation targets as opposed to developing-nation targets. 
Hence H3 is supported.  
However, since the fixed effect model might result in inconsistent coefficient estimates 
with the presence of serial correlation in the error term, Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data 
estimation (GMM estimation with robust errors) is then employed for estimation adjustment and 
robustness check. This GMM estimation is designed for datasets with many panels and few 
periods. It first differences the model to exclude the fixed effects. Then it instruments the 
differenced lagged dependent variables to address the potential endogeneity issues resulting from 
the involvement of lagged dependent variables as the explanatory variables. Further, I employ a 
two-step GMM in the estimation. It obtains parameter estimates based on the initial weight 
matrix, computes a new weight matrix based on those estimates in the first step, and then re-
estimates the parameters based on that weight matrix in the second step. These methods make 
this two-step GMM estimator consistent and more asymptotically efficient than the fixed effect 
estimation. Results of the two-step GMM estimation are thus consistent with those in the fixed 
effect estimation (shown in model 1(b) and 2(b)). Further Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation 
indicates that there is no autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. And the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions suggests that there is no overidentification problem in the GMM 
estimation. 
In sum, the empirical results support the hypothesis that emerging-market acquirers’ 
domestic productivity is enhanced following the cross-border M&A activities, suggesting that 
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they are able to learn from foreign targets. This home productivity increase stems from acquiring 
developed-nation targets as opposed to developing-nation targets, which corroborates existing 
wisdom that emerging-market MNEs use international expansion to exploit their existing 
competitive advantages in other emerging-market, whereas they seek to acquire strategic assets 
and learn when investing in developed nations (Luo & Tung, 2007). Further, results show that 
emerging-market acquirers upgrade domestic productivity via cross-border M&As but not via 
international alliances, suggesting that cross-border M&A is a relatively superior governance 
mode to engage in learning as compared to international alliances. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This study concludes that emerging-market acquirers can achieve productivity gains at home via 
cross-border M&A activities. Empirical results based on Chinese acquirers suggest that despite 
the fact that emerging-market acquirers are often late comers in the global market with 
competitive disadvantage, they are able to assimilate the learning from foreign targets and 
upgrade their domestic productivity following the cross-border M&As. Moreover, this study 
demonstrates that Chinese acquirers gain productivity via acquiring developed-nation targets as 
opposed to developing-nation targets, suggesting that only the developed-nation targets possess 
the needed strategic assets. Further, results suggest that cross-border M&As are the superior 
vehicles for Chinese acquirers to engage in learning as compared to international alliances. 
In emerging-markets, with their institutional environment context characterized by low 
resource munificence and continuous economic liberalization, a theoretical extension of the 
current perspective is needed (Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007). More empirical studies are needed 
with regard to the process and impact of emerging-market firms’ internationalization. Although 
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scholars have pointed out the learning perspective of the emerging-market MNEs (Makino, Lau, 
& Yeh, 2002; Luo & Tung, 2007), to my knowledge no study has been done to empirically 
examine whether these MNEs generally learned or not via international expansion, nor there are 
studies on if the learning acquired abroad is assimilated back at their home market. This study 
verifies that different from the internationalization of early Japanese and Swedish MNEs, 
Chinese MNEs are able to learn from the ‘accelerated internationalization’ (Mathews & Zander, 
2007) characterized by aggressive large-scale cross-border M&As. One rational of this 
accelerated internationalization is that Chinese acquirers may expect that even though their initial 
investments in developed nations may not be profitable and as a stand-alone investment would 
not make economic sense, from a real options perspective there will be subsequent "follow-on" 
investments (i.e., the “growth options”) back in Chinese domestic market, leading to larger 
profitability at home that more than offsets lower economic returns (or even losses) in developed 
nations. Therefore future studies may consider a real options perspective to explain the 
emerging-market firms’ outward FDI. 
This study has also important practical implications as it suggests that the ‘Go Global’ 
policy initiated by the Chinese government in 1999 is taking effect. China, as the global 
production hub, its productivity increase is likely to have a profound impact on the global 
economy. As Chinese government is making an ongoing commitment to further facilitate and 
encourage this ‘Go Global’ Policy, Chinese outward FDI will be expected to grow and continue 
to alter the current global layout. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 3.1. Chinese Cross-border M&As by Target Industry. 
Target Industry Frequency Percent 
Financial 50 8.65 
Manufacturing 203 35.12 
Natural Resources 201 34.78 
Other 4 0.69 
Services 90 15.57 
Trade 30 5.19 
Total 578 100 
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Table 3.2. Chinese Cross-border M&As by Target Nation. 
Developing Nation 
 
Developed Nation 
 
Newly Industrialized Nation 
Target 
Nation 
Freq % 
Target 
Nation 
Freq % 
 
Target Nation Freq % 
 
Target 
Nation 
Freq % 
Argentina 1 0.17 Kazakhstan 5 0.87 
 
Australia 92 15.9 
 
Hong Kong 153 26.5 
Azerbaijan 1 0.17 Lesotho 1 0.17 
 
Austria 1 0.17 
 
Singapore 18 3.11 
Barbados 2 0.35 Liberia 1 0.17 
 
Belgium 3 0.52 
 
South Korea 7 1.21 
Belarus 1 0.17 Macau 3 0.52 
 
British Virgin 2 0.35 
 
Taiwan 4 0.69 
Bermuda 1 0.17 Malaysia 4 0.69 
 
Canada 44 7.61 
 
Total 182 31.5 
Brazil 8 1.38 Mexico 3 0.52 
 
Cayman 
Islands 
2 0.35 
    
Chile 4 0.69 Mongolia 3 0.52 
 
Denmark 1 0.17 
    
Colombia 1 0.17 Nigeria 3 0.52 
 
Finland 1 0.17 
    
Cyprus 1 0.17 Peru 2 0.35 
 
France 9 1.56 
    
Czech 
Republic 
1 0.17 Philippines 2 0.35 
 
Germany 11 1.9 
    
Dem Rep 
Congo 
1 0.17 Poland 2 0.35 
 
Italy 10 1.73 
    
Ecuador 1 0.17 Portugal 1 0.17 
 
Japan 17 2.94 
    
Egypt 2 0.35 Romania 1 0.17 
 
Netherlands 7 1.21 
    
Estonia 1 0.17 Russian Fed 6 1.04 
 
New Zealand 4 0.69 
    
Greece 1 0.17 Sierra Leone 1 0.17 
 
Norway 5 0.87 
    
Guinea 1 0.17 South Africa 4 0.69 
 
Spain 1 0.17 
    
Haiti 1 0.17 Sri Lanka 2 0.35 
 
Sweden 4 0.69 
    
Hungary 4 0.69 Syria 1 0.17 
 
Switzerland 2 0.35 
    
India 3 0.52 Tajikistan 1 0.17 
 
United 
Kingdom 
16 2.77 
    
Indonesia 7 1.21 Thailand 11 1.9 
 
United States 50 8.65 
    
Iran 1 0.17 Ukraine 2 0.35 
 
Total 282 48.8 
    
Israel 2 0.35 Vietnam 3 0.52 
        
Jamaica 2 0.35 Zambia 1 0.17 
        
Jordan 1 0.17 Zimbabwe 2 0.35 
        
Total 114 19.7 
           
 
Table 3.3. Chinese Cross-Border M&As in Most Concentrated Nations: By Industry. 
Industry US UK Japan Canada Australia 
Manufacturing 31 5 14 6 8 
Natural Resources 11 9 1 33 79 
Services 6 2 1 2 4 
Trade 2 0 1 1 1 
Total 50 16 17 43 92 
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Figure 3.1. Trend of Chinese Cross-Border M&As of the U.S. Targets: By Industry. 
 
 
Table 3.4. Variable Description. 
  Variable Name Measurement 
Dependent 
Variable 
LnSale Log of Chinese acquirer’s domestic sales 
Independent 
Variables 
CrossBorderM&A Number of yearly cross-border M&As  
InternationalAlliance Number of yearly international alliances 
DomesticM&A Number of yearly domestic M&As 
DomesticAlliance Number of yearly domestic alliances 
LnLabor Log of Chinese acquirer’s number of domestic employees 
LnCapital Log of Chinese acquirer’s capital 
LnMaterial Log of Chinese acquirer’s raw materials 
LnSale_lagk Lagged lnSale in year (t-k) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
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Manufacturing
Natural Resources
Services
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Table 3.5. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations. 
  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.LnSale 21.318 1.679 1 
         
2.LnCapital 8.081 1.418 0.880* 1 
        
3.LnEmployee 8.680 1.489 0.618* 0.596* 1 
       
4.LnMaterial 4.453 2.024 0.690* 0.662* 0.581* 1 
      
5.Sum(CB M&A_2-4) 0.340 0.962 0.195* 0.181* 0.159* 0.118* 1 
     
6.Sum(CB M&A_2-4)_Developed 0.277 0.793 0.137* 0.137* 0.116* 0.099* 0.933* 1 
    
7.Sum(CB M&A_2-4)_Developing 0.064 0.362 0.218* 0.181* 0.168* 0.104* 0.613* 0.288* 1 
   
8.Sum(CB Alliance_2-4) 0.270 0.854 0.271* 0.266* 0.234* 0.214* 0.096* 0.050 0.146* 1 
  
9.Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4) 0.653 1.692 0.303* 0.334* 0.240* 0.198* 0.158* 0.110* 0.179* 0.089* 1 
 
10.Sum(Domestic Alliance_2-4) 0.076 0.375 0.253* 0.308* 0.225* 0.171* 0.136* 0.076* 0.194* 0.097* 0.206* 1 
 
Correlation is significant at * p < 0.10. 
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Table 3.6. Effect of Cross-Border M&As on Chinese Acquirer’s TFP. 
 
Model 1(a) 2(a) 1(b) 2(b) 
DV: LnSale Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 2-step GMM 2-step GMM 
LnCapital 0.423*** 0.423*** 0.263*** 0.262*** 
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.078) (0.078) 
LnEmployee 0.006 0.006 -0.018 -0.019 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.033) 
LnMaterial 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.056* 0.055* 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) 
Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 0.032** 
 
0.037*** 
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.014) 
 
Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 
_Developed-nation Target  
0.030* 
 
0.038** 
  
(0.018) 
 
(0.017) 
Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 
_Developing-nation Target  
0.041 
 
0.033 
  
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
Sum(international  Alliance_2-4) 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.024 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4) -0.009* -0.009* -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sum(Domestic Alliance_2-4) 0.013 0.012 0.074* 0.074* 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.041) (0.041) 
LnSale_Lag1 0.421*** 0.421*** 0.540*** 0.539*** 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.118) (0.118) 
LnSale_Lag2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.042 -0.041 
 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.061) (0.060) 
LnSale_Lag3 -0.130* -0.130* -0.070 -0.070 
 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) 
Constant 10.19*** 10.19*** 8.590*** 8.591*** 
 
(1.032) (1.033) (2.557) (2.528) 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effect  YES YES YES YES 
N 2001 2001 1621 1621 
r2 0.672 0.672 
  
 
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ESSAY 3: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECTS EMERGING-MARKET 
ACQUIRERS’ PRODUCTIVITY GAINS VIA CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE ACQUIRERS 
INTRODUCTION 
Existing studies have pointed out that corporate governance significantly influences firm 
performance (e.g., Black et al., 2006; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Murphy, 1985), especially in countries with weak legal protections for investors (Klapper & 
Love, 2004). Therefore corporate governance becomes critical for firm success in emerging-
markets where the economy is constantly in transition and characterized with unique complexity 
such as government control, social and political uncertainty, weak legal regime, etc. Chinese 
firms have realized that corporate governance is the core for achieving the modern corporate 
enterprise system (Tenev, Zhang, & Brefort, 2002). Ever since 1997, the government has 
expedited the pace of modern enterprise reform with privatization of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), removing unnecessary state departments, changing management systems, and 
establishing a basic corporate legal framework. This reform not only aims to enhance corporate 
productivity and financial performance, but also to create an optimal institutional arrangement 
that is compatible with reforms towards a market-oriented economy (OECD, 2011). 
Transitioning from SOEs to modern corporate enterprises has a profound impact on the 
development of Chinese indigenous firms. It creates unique complexity in Chinese firms in that 
they can have the attributes of both SOEs and market-oriented enterprises. As cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) represent strategic instruments for emerging-market 
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indigenous firms to learn from overseas and upgrade domestic productivity, it behooves us to 
focus on emerging-market acquirer’s heterogeneity in corporate governance and its impact on 
productivity gains subsequent to the cross-border M&A activities. 
Substantial evidence has shown that optimal governance likely differs between developed 
and emerging-markets (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009). And even within a single country, optimal 
governance may depend on firm characteristics (Arcot & Bruno, 2006; Bruno & Claessens, 2007; 
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Given the fact that many emerging-market firms have distinct attributes 
that are different from developed-nation firms, earlier findings based on developed-nation 
evidence may not be applicable to emerging-markets. Therefore in this study I seek to contribute 
to existing literature by examining emerging-market firm-level heterogeneity in corporate 
governance – i.e., acquirer’s government ownership, top management team (TMT) incentive 
mechanisms, and chairman education – which are conducive to firms being able to learn and 
upgrade domestic productivity from their cross-border M&A activities. Based on data of 578 
cross-border M&As by 266 Chinese acquirers over 2000-2011, I find that: (1) Government 
ownership decreases the effect of cross-border M&As on subsequent domestic productivity 
upgrading, which indicates that state-owned enterprises are indeed less efficient in terms of 
learning; (2) Regarding management incentive mechanisms, top management team equity 
ownership enhances acquirer’s domestic productivity via cross-border M&A activities, whereas 
top executive pay does not. It indicates that stock rewards are more efficient than cash rewards in 
incentivizing managers to align their interests with the firm and alleviate agency problems. (3) 
Counterintuitively, chairman’s education degree negatively affects acquirers’ learning via cross-
border M&A activities. These findings suggest that existing literature needs to be enriched to 
incorporate the distinct attributes of emerging-market corporate governance.  
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The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows: The next section 
provides the theoretical analysis and generates three main hypotheses. The third section outlines 
the empirical design and presents empirical results. The fourth section concludes the essay with 
discussion. 
 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
One of the salient characteristics of Chinese indigenous firms is the government ownership and 
control involved in profit-driven firm management. After the modern enterprise reform, most of 
the listed companies were restructured SOEs that had gone through shareholding restructuring 
towards the increasing involvement of the private equity. As a result, the number of listed SOEs 
decreased while non-SOEs grew. However, as the SOEs could still hold controlling shares of 
those listed companies, many of the old SOE management styles and mechanisms were 
maintained. The mixture of SOE leftover and modern corporate practice created great challenges 
for efficient corporate management, which have made it necessary to establish a new corporate 
governance framework (OECD, 2011).  The improvement of the corporate governance of listed 
companies was a major theme of China’s capital market development during the past two 
decades: Government control has mitigated with decreasing government shares and increasing 
firm management autonomy; management stock awards are introduced in order to align TMT 
interests with the shareholder’s; and the TMT selection are evolving from government 
assignment to shareholder meeting appointment. 
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Government Ownership on Learning  
Before the reform, most of the listed firms were SOEs with high ownership concentration. One 
of the major intentions of modern enterprise reform is to improve the inherent inefficiency of 
SOEs through privatization and equity diversification.  
SOEs carry the mission of bolstering a nation’s social, political, and economic 
development. Yet the profit-driven considerations are not always congruent with the social and 
political objectives. They could be subordinated to political and social exigencies (Boardman, 
Freeman, & Eckel, 1986). SOE decisions are subject to the influence and control of the 
government, who might be aiming to leverage a firm's resources in order to promote social and 
political objectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994, 1997; Dixit, 1997). And SOEs sometimes can get 
subsidy from government for their loss of economic benefits due to pursuing political and social 
objectives. For non-SOE firms, however, their goal is simply profit maximization, thus decisions 
are based solely on economic considerations. They have to thrive for profits and be responsible 
for their own loss. Therefore, SOEs’ motivation and efforts towards efficiency differ from non-
SOEs in essence.   
The principal-agent problem manifests especially in SOEs. The influence of the planned 
economic system under the government still exists after the modern enterprise reform. The 
complete socialization of risks and benefits doesn’t clearly define rights and responsibilities, thus 
TMTs lack of incentives to discover and pursue business opportunities (Tenev, Zhang, & Brefort, 
2002). Moreover, many SOE managers are government officials who carry out government 
policy to ensure social and political harmony and are incentivized to pursue promotion to higher 
levels of government hierarchy. Many of these managerial positions are only for a finite period. 
Managers often ‘rotate’ to a similar or higher position with another SOE after a certain period. 
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Their compensation is largely fixed in accordance with their government title and rank rather 
than depending on firm profitability. Accordingly, their interests are not properly aligned with 
firm performance. Therefore SOE managers may lack incentives to collect necessary information 
and devote themselves to firm’s profit maximization. Due to the unclear-defined property rights, 
SOEs often have a weak management supervision system. Therefore it is difficult to monitor and 
restrict manager’s misconduct that is divergent from shareholder interests in SOEs. Often the 
government of a higher level supervises the SOE managers. However, it is not necessarily the 
shareholder thus it lacks of incentive to protect the firm against manager’s misconducts. Also, 
many laws and regulations are ambiguous and inadequate during the ongoing corporate 
governance reform, which makes it even more difficult to supervise the principal-agent problems 
in SOEs. In contrast, in non-SOEs, managers are usually appointed by the board and are 
responsible for firm’s performance. Meanwhile, shareholders act as supervisory board to prevent 
manager’s pursuit of self-interest. Therefore, the principal-agent problem tends to be alleviated 
in non-SOEs as compared to SOE.  
SOE management often lacks of professional expertise and competency in managing a 
SOE with complicated layers of hierarchy. On one hand, SOE management is often not selected 
on performance basis but by government-nomination (Zhang & Parker, 2002). In many 
occasions, the SOE chairman also acts as secretary of the Party committee. Essentially they are 
government officials rather than professional managers. When making decisions, they tend to 
rely on administrative control and central planning from upper-level government. Thus they 
often do not have the necessary knowledge and experiences to operate a profit-driven economic 
entity. In addition, the complexity in SOE multilevel hierarchies creates additional challenges for 
management to achieve efficiency. Information does not flow freely across different layers of 
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hierarchy and the principal-agent problem exists across multiple layers. The prolonged principal-
agent distance aggravates the information asymmetry problem. Therefore it becomes more 
difficult for upper-level management to acquire the accurate information from the low hierarchy. 
And the possibility of agent’s self-interest pursuit at the expense of shareholder interests may 
increase due to the aggravated information asymmetry problem. Meanwhile, the decision-making 
process must go through a hierarchical process of examination and approval by different levels 
of management. This process can be very time-consuming which requires many administrative 
procedures and coordination across the hierarchies. As a result, SOE management tends to have 
inflexible decision making and a lack of versatility. Under these circumstances, it is quite 
difficult for SOE management to make correct decisions in an efficient and timely manner, 
whereas non-SOEs are considered to be more efficient in dealing with risks and information 
asymmetry due to their being free of government intervention and lack of administrative 
hierarchies.  
In sum, SOEs are generally considered not to be as efficient as non-SOE firms due to 
their social welfare and political consideration, misalignment of the interests between 
management and shareholders, and incompetency of government officials as firm management. 
Cross-border M&A activities involve higher level of information asymmetry due to acquirer’s 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). External factors such as cultural diversity (Gomez-Mejia 
& Palich, 1997; Hofstede, 1980) and the variety of customers, competitors, and regulations 
create further barriers for acquirer to grasp accurate information from abroad. Moreover, as firms 
increase the global scope of their operations they must also deal with the added complexity of 
integrating and coordinating an increasingly far-flung web of businesses and value chain 
activities (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Egelhoff, 1982; Roth, 1995; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). 
 78 
 
These complexity involved in international activities requires the acquirer to be more competent 
than pure domestic firms so that they are able to assemble and analyze the information in a 
timely and correct manner. However, the inherent inefficiency involved in SOEs will likely 
hinder the efficiency of overseas knowledge transfer and absorption that enables domestic 
productivity increase. Therefore, SOE will underperform as compared to non-SOEs in their 
abilities to learn via cross-border M&As. H1 is proposed,  
 
H(1): Government ownership of emerging-market acquirers negatively affects the 
relationship between cross-border M&A activities and  domestic productivity 
upgrading in subsequent years.  
 
TMT Incentive Mechanisms for Learning 
Under the property right regime of modern enterprises, TMT (the “agent”) and shareholder (the 
principal)’s objectives are often not in line with each other. Principal seeks firm profit 
maximization whereas the agent seeks personal income and welfare maximization (including 
various forms of monetary compensation, labor insurance, promotion, etc.) (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). An agent does not have residual claim right over firm’s profit. Thus, the agent may take 
advantage of his/her management control power to seek for his own interests at the expense of 
principal’s benefits. Problems of moral hazard and adverse selection arise. A challenge for 
China’s modern enterprise reform is how to increase management’s (the agent’s) autonomy 
while making them accountable to the state (the principal) as the owner of the assets, i.e., how to 
control the agency costs of management autonomy. The agency costs of this increased autonomy 
have manifested in various incentives for managers to maintain or acquire private benefits of 
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control through on-the-job consumption and other rents related to investment and expansion 
(Tenev, Zhang, & Brefort, 2002). TMT incentives can be aligned with the preferences of the 
shareholders through compensation arrangements that reward TMTs for firm performance 
(Lewellen et al., 1992; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Since TMTs play an important role in firm’s 
daily operation and decision making, an effective TMT incentive mechanism is needed 
especially in emerging-markets where the external supervision mechanisms are underdeveloped. 
The principal can link agent’s compensation with firm performance using salary, bonus, equity 
ownership
16
, etc. These incentive mechanisms match the residual claim rights with agent’s 
management control power thus minimizing the potential agency costs.  
TMT incentive mechanisms in China have experienced three development stages: (1) 
base salary + bonus + annual profit sharing; (2) annual salary; (3) annual salary + bonus + equity 
ownership. While (1) and (2) focus on TMT’s short-run cash incentives, (3) also includes the 
long-run incentive of stock rewards, thus it deals with the conflicts incurred by TMT’s short-run 
interests against firms long-run profit maximization. Cash payment
17
 and stock rewards have 
become the two most important TMT incentive mechanisms since the modern enterprise reform. 
However, cash payment remains low relative to developed nations. The configuration of TMT 
incentives is largely single. Cash payment is still the major incentive as compared to stock 
awards incentive. It takes up some 80% of TMT’s total income. Whereas few of the listed firms 
have adopted long-run stock incentives and the stock rewards are very limited with only small 
portion. It suggests that China’s transition to the modern corporate enterprises is still in an early 
stage.   
 
                                                 
16 TMT equity ownership refers to the stock rewards such as stock, stock option, and stock appreciation right that a listed firm 
grants to its TMT in order to align TMT’s interests with the shareholders. 
17 TMT pay here includes all kinds of cash awards such as annual salary, bonus, subsidy, etc. 
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TMT Pay 
TMT compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs. A link between TMT pay and 
corporate performance provides an incentive for management to exert appropriate efforts on 
behalf of shareholders (Lewellen, et al., 1992). The relationship between TMT pay and firm 
performance has been widely studied across various disciplines, ranging from economics, 
finance, to management. Most TMT compensation research is directed primarily at the CEO 
despite the fact that CEO compensation typically differs somewhat from TMT pay (Carpenter & 
Sanders, 2002). Findings generally suggest that TMT pay has a positive effect on firm’s 
performance.  
TMT pay is associated with the quality of managerial human capital which includes age, 
education, managerial expertise, and functional expertise (Becker, 1962; Harris & Helfat, 1997). 
TMTs are selected and evaluated based on their overall capabilities and receive the level of 
payment accordingly (Carpenter & Wade, 2002; Leonard, 1990). High levels of TMT pay may 
indicate that management has valuable, rare, and non-substitutable talent and intellectual 
resources that are needed by the firm (Barney, 1991). These human capital resources enable 
TMTs to manage the firm more efficiently. Consequently, firms that make higher investments in 
TMT human capital through higher levels of TMT pay are likely to achieve firm success. 
High TMT pay also improves the attractiveness of the firm and helps to retain human 
talent in the long-run (Wade, Porac & Pollock, 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). High TMT pay 
makes management’s switching cost high. From an agency perspective, the “locking-in” of TMT 
talents for a long time cultivates their psychological feeling of being the master of the firm. TMT 
tend to devote themselves to firm development at the moment because they expect that their 
interests will be tied up to firm’s future gains. The principal-agent problem could hence be 
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reduced. According to Carpenter and Sanders (2004), “compensation arrangements can influence 
executives’ behaviors through their effects on perceptions of the environment (Gomez-Mejia, 
1994), risk-taking propensity (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), willingness to cooperate across business 
units (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991), and group dynamics and cooperation among TMT members 
(Hambrick, 1995).” High TMT pay enhances management’s perceptions of the firm and their 
willingness to cooperate. These behavioral factors are important determinants of how well TMT 
may process information, which in turn affect the strategic choices that lead to firm performance 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). 
High TMT pay compensates management for increased complexity involved with 
international business. Scholars have pointed out that the task of managing the complexity 
arising from dependence on foreign markets typically requires TMT with more highly developed 
managerial skills, and a willingness to fully apply them, than is required in largely domestic 
firms of equal size in the same industry (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; 
Prahalad, 1990). MNEs generally face greater information-processing demands than purely 
domestic firms (Egelhoff, 1982; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Weick & Van Orden, 1990). In 
addition, strategic initiatives in a global context typically take longer to execute than in purely 
domestic ones (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991), which implies greater risk for both the firm and its 
managers. Therefore, managing an international business requires additional efforts and 
responsibility from TMT as compared to pure domestic management. TMTs deserve higher pay 
which is commensurate with their extra efforts to deal with the increased complexity and risk 
associated with international business (Eisenhardt, 1989; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). 
Higher TMT pay incentivizes management to make more efforts in daily firm operation, which 
in turn facilitate superior information processing (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). As a result, if 
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high TMT pay allows a MNE to attract the best management human capital and encourages them 
to pursue activities requisite to firm success, it should be a positive association between the level 
of TMT pay in MNEs and subsequent levels of firm performance. In the context of emerging-
market acquirer’s learning via cross-border M&As, it means that high TMT is likely to increase 
the effect of cross-border M&As on acquirer’s subsequent domestic productivity. I propose H2(a) 
as, 
 
H(2a): TMT pay of emerging-market acquirers positively affects the relationship between 
cross-border M&A activities and  domestic productivity upgrading in subsequent 
years.  
 
TMT Equity Ownership 
Shareholders' equity represents the remaining interests and residual claim right in a firm. There 
has been extensive research on the relationship between equity ownership and firm performance. 
However, studies have not reached a consensus: Modest evidence exists that equity ownership is 
correlated with higher market valuation (e.g., Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Lins, 2003). At the 
same time, some suggest that very large ownership positions (25 to 50 percent) lead to lower 
market valuation since it allows for management entrenchment or misuse of firm assets for 
personal benefit (Larcker, 2011).  
However, TMT equity ownership incentive plays a very limited role in China. Equity 
ownership incentive appeared in China's listing firms with the development of modern enterprise 
system. The majority of TMT incentives are still cash rewards, whereas the stock incentives such 
as stock options, restricted stock, stock appreciation rights are still in their early development 
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stage. From 2006-2008, only 29 out of around 2000 listed firms in China have adopted the stock 
incentive mechanisms. Among them, 19 adopted the stock option incentive, 8 adopted restricted 
stock incentive, and 2 adopted stock appreciation rights
18
. In contrast, stock awards have become 
one of the main incentive mechanisms in western corporation system.   
TMT equity ownership helps to discourage self-interest-driven behavior. When TMT are 
also shareholders, shareholders may not always be subject to conflicts of interests with managers 
and directors (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Krug & 
Aguilera, 2004). Managerial misconduct that impairs firm value would inflict corresponding 
damage to his/her personal wealth. Thus TMTs that hold equity in the firm have greater 
incentives to build the economic value of the firm. That is, equity ownership is expected to 
mitigate agency problems as well as cash rewards. However, cash and equity ownership rewards 
have very different attributes and have been shown to differentially affect TMT behaviors and 
strategic choices (Sanders, 2001). Prior research has reported that the environmental and firm 
conditions associated with high levels of complexity tend to ensure that firms rely on long-term 
incentives like equity ownership as compared to cash forms (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; 
Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). High levels of TMT total 
compensation are typically correlated with pay packages that have been skewed toward long-
term incentives such as stock options (Murphy, 1999). According to Carpenter and Sanders 
(2004), “particularly skilled executives with high levels of human capital should be able to 
bargain for greater levels of stock option pay relative to cash pay, because such pay affords them 
the greatest opportunity to amass wealth.” And firms are increasingly willing to reward excellent 
management with long-run payments as they are tied to firm performance. In addition, equity 
ownership may orient TMT towards capital investment projects which benefit the firm in the 
                                                 
18 Information based on data employed in the dissertation.  
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long-run (Larcker, 1983). It helps the TMT to focus on firm-level outcomes, rather than be 
myopically preoccupied with their self-interests at the expense of firm performance.  
When TMT members are rewarded for long run and firm-level thinking, they may be 
more likely to function as an integrated and cooperative team (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004). The 
cooperation among TMT members further facilitates the information-processing efficiency 
across the firm (Hambrick, 1995), which is particularly important for MNEs conducting business 
in multiple geographic locations. Equity ownership is found to be positively related to firm value 
across 18 emerging-markets, especially in countries with low shareholder protection (Lins, 2003). 
Since MNEs engage in knowledge transfer in multiple international networks, it is a prerequisite 
that information flows efficiently across different units of the MNE. In this case, long-run firm-
level TMT rewards like equity ownership should incentivize the management towards proactive 
cooperation across units, thus promote the knowledge transfer and sharing between MNE units 
across the globe. Consequently, MNEs that emphasize equity ownership should perform better. 
Therefore, higher TMT ownership should incentivize management to engage in better learning 
subsequent to the cross-border M&A activities. Hence H2(b) is proposed, 
 
H(2b): TMT equity ownership of emerging-market acquirers positively affects the 
relationship between cross-border M&A activities and domestic productivity 
upgrading in subsequent years.  
 
Chairman Education on Learning 
The impact of education on business success has been the subject of much discussion in both 
academic publications and news press. Extant findings generally support the relationship 
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between levels of education and business success (e.g., Robinson & Sexton, 1994; van der Sluis, 
van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2008). 
Human capital theory (Becker, 1975; Bosma et al., 2004; Gimeno et al., 1997) suggests 
that education helps to enhance managerial capabilities, impact the quality and quantity of labor, 
or signal production ability in labor markets that have incomplete information (Dickson, 
Solomon, & Weaver, 2008). Talents with high educations tend to possess the requisite absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) to cope with the complexity involved in international 
settings. There is substantial complexity in cross-border M&A activities because of conducting 
business in various national, social, political, and geographical contexts. The acquisition process 
consists of many interdependent sub-activities such as due diligence, negotiation, financing, 
integration, and post-acquisition corporate planning, each of which is complex in itself (Hitt et 
al., 2001). Chairman with high education degree should have been equipped with a more diverse 
knowledge background and capabilities to deal with complex problems. Thus, they tend to 
possess more human capital to anticipate, understand, analyze, and tackle the challenges 
involved in cross-border M&As than those who has lower education, which enables them to be 
able to better deal with the acquisition complexity and promote the knowledge transfer and 
sharing between acquirer’s foreign and domestic units subsequent to cross-border M&A 
activities. Since education acts as a signal of ability which contributes to productivity (Harmon, 
Oosterbeek, & Walker, 2003), it is reasonable to expect that a chairman’s high education degree 
will lead to larger effect of cross-border M&A activities on acquirer’s domestic productivity than 
a low education degree. Thus H3 is proposed as below. 
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H(3): Education of emerging-market acquirer’s chairman positively affects the 
relationship between cross-border M&A activities and  domestic productivity 
upgrading in subsequent years.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Data for this essay were compiled and matched from three different sources: Thomson SDC 
Platinum database (for data on global M&As and alliances), Compustat Global database (for data 
on Chinese firm’s balance sheets), and China RESSET database (for data on domestic sales, 
number of employees, and corporate governance of Chinese publicly listed firms). First, I 
manually matched SDC and RESSET in order to identify the Chinese publicly listed firms which 
have cross-border M&As. Second, I manually matched Compustat Global with SDC in order to 
capture the accounting-based information of these Chinese publicly listed firms (i.e., capital and 
materials). Third, I matched these firms with their domestic M&As, domestic alliances, and 
international alliances in SDC database. Last, I merged the above three matched databases into 
the final dataset. The final data is panel in nature and is composed of 266 Chinese acquirers with 
578 cross-border M&As over 2000-2011.  
The model consists of variables on production, corporate governance, M&As, and 
alliances. Detailed summary statistics of these variables are displayed in Table 4.5. And a 
description of the variable names and their measurements is provided in Table 4.4. The 
dependent variable is the log of the firm’s domestic sales. Three independent variables - capital, 
labor, and materials - provide a means to assess firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) (Javorcik, 
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2004; Siegel & Simons, 2010; Wang, et al., 2012). TFP is the residual in productivity
19
 that is 
not explained by the production inputs (i.e., labor, capital, and materials). Although the 
dependent variable is log of sales, the coefficients of the explanatory variables essentially capture 
the effects on TFP since the effects of production inputs on sales are teased out at the right hand 
of the equation. 
The focal explanatory variables on the acquirer corporate governance are SOE, TMT Pay, 
TMT Share Percentage, and Chairman Education Degree. SOE is the proxy for government 
ownership, which is a dummy variable coded as “0” (if government shares are less than or equal 
to 50% of the firm total shares) and “1” (if government shares are more than 50% of the firm 
total shares, i.e., the majority ownership). Table 4.1 describe the trend of Chinese acquirer’s 
government ownership over 2000-2010. The percentage of state-controlled acquirers dropped 
from 43.4% in 2000 to 31.6% in 2010, which suggests the ongoing privatization of SOEs since 
the corporate governance reform in mid-1990s
20
, in spite of the slightly increase of the SOEs in 
2009 following the 2008 global economic downturn. TMT Pay and TMT Share Percentage are 
employed to capture TMT incentive mechanisms. TMT Pay includes the cash rewards such as 
salary, subsidy, bonus, etc., but excludes stock rewards such as stock option and dividends. It is 
measured by the log value of the sum of top three executives’ annual pay. TMT Share 
Percentage represents TMT equity ownership, which is calculated as a ratio of TMT shares over 
firm total shares. Table 4.2 shows that TMT equity ownership kept increasing over 2000-2010 
from 0.148% to 11.789%. However, the mean of variable TMT Share Percentage_2-4, 0.02 
(Table 4.5), indicates that on average acquirer TMT have only 2% of firm total shares in the 
                                                 
19 Productivity is the ratio of output to inputs in production, measured by the value of output (sales) divided by the value of 
production inputs (labor, capital, and materials). 
20
 An essential element for corporate governance reform launched in 1994 was corporatization of SOEs with their ideal forms 
being limited share companies or share holding companies. 
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prior two to four years in China, which is very small relative to developed nations. In addition, 
74% of the acquirers don’t have TMT shares at all by the end of 2010. This suggests that TMT 
share incentive mechanisms are very underdeveloped in China: Only a few of the Chinese 
acquirers have adopted the TMT stock incentive mechanisms, and it plays a very limited role in 
TMT incentive systems. Chairman Education Degree is a proxy for chairman’s education 
background and capability, which is measured by a dummy variable of “0” (if Chairman’s 
highest education degree is below bachelor) and “1” (if Chairman’s highest education degree is 
bachelor and above). Table 4.3 shows that 85-90% of the chairmen of Chinese acquirers have 
education degrees above the bachelor level.  
Another explanatory variable is Cross-border M&A. It is measured by number of 
acquirer’s cross-border M&As in the prior years. Other control variables include acquirer’s 
Domestic M&As, International Alliances, and Domestic Alliances. They are respectively 
measured by number of acquirer’s domestic M&As, international alliance, and domestic 
alliances in the prior years. Lagged sales and year dummies are also include in the model. Firm’s 
international and domestic alliances are used to control for firm’s potential learning via alliance 
activities. Similarly, firm’s domestic M&As are controlled for to exclude the potential learning 
via domestic M&A activities. Firm’s domestic alliances are used to control for firm’s potential 
learning via domestic alliance activities. Similarly, firm’s domestic M&As are controlled for to 
exclude the potential learning via domestic M&A activities. As pointed out by Lei, Hitt, and 
Bettis (1996), learning from prior experiences may be crucial in attempting to enhance the 
performance of acquisitions. Given that absorptive capacity is one form of a firm's learning 
capability, it is expected that the level of absorptive capacity that the firm possesses would be 
closely associated with the amount of prior experiences that the firm has in acquiring strategic 
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assets from other firms (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). Hence, domestic M&As and alliance 
activities may as well contribute to firm’s learning and absorptive capacity besides international 
alliances and cross-border M&As. 
Following the approach in Siegel and Simons (2010), I specify the model as, 
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where    captures the effect of cross-border M&A activities in the previous year   on firm’s TFP 
in the current year t (t>  ). ∑                 
   
      denotes the sum of firm’s yearly number 
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of M&As from year t-m to year t-n. I sum up the lagged number of cross-border M&As to 
capture learning via cross-border M&As. Since learning takes time, learning will not lead to 
productivity gains contemporaneously. In addition, according to Ahuja and Katila (2001), the 
impact of an acquisition is likely to be felt over a number of years, rather than entirely in any one 
year. Thus the total impact of an acquisition may be statistically inconsequential in any one year 
and the regression coefficients on the lagged cross-number M&As can be summed to obtain the 
total impact of an acquisition across time (Gujarati, 1988). 
Similarly, ∑                 
   
     , ∑                        
   
     , and 
∑                   
   
      capture the cumulative sum of a firm’s yearly count of domestic 
M&A, domestic alliance, and international alliance experiences respectively from year t-m to 
year t-n. I expect to find a positive and significant   in model 1.  
I employ interaction variables to examine the focal effect of corporate governance on the 
relationship between cross-border M&As and acquirer’s domestic productivity (i.e., learning via 
cross-border M&A activities). For the effect of SOE on learning,       
           denotes the 
average of state majority ownership from year t-m to year t-n. Interaction variable 
∑                 
   
            
           thus captures the effect of government majority 
ownership on acquirer’s learning via cross-border M&A activities. If SOE has a 
positive/negative effect on the learning,    will be positively/negatively significant. 
Similarly,        
             ,       
                               , and 
      
                 are the average of TMT pay and chairman education degree from year 
t-m to t-n. Interaction variables ∑                 
   
            
             , 
∑                 
   
            
                and ∑                 
   
      
      
                             ) capture the effect of TMT pay, chairman education, 
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and TMT equity ownership on acquirer’s learning via cross-border M&A activities respectively. 
Coefficient    ,   , and    are expected to be positive and significant, representing the positive 
impact of chairman degree and TMT incentive mechanisms on acquirer’s learning via cross-
border M&A activities.  
I employ a dynamic panel data method to estimate the model. The lagged dependent 
variables are included as independent variables to estimate the appropriate coefficient estimates 
in light of the presence of autoregressive dynamics (Finkel, 1995) and to take care of the omitted 
variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002). To capture the total lagged cross-number M&As across time, 
the two-year, three-year, and four-year lagged number of cross-border M&As were summed as a 
focal explanatory variable in the model. Illustratively speaking, the acquirer’s domestic 
productivity in 2009 is potentially influenced by acquisitions made in 2007, 2006, and 2005. The 
first-year lagged number of cross-border M&As was not included in the model since emerging-
market acquirers tend to undertake initial restructuring of the target firms (Chari, Chen, & 
Dominguez, 2012) and thus the learning effect may not manifest as quickly as in the first year 
following the cross-border M&As. My explorative test of the effect of the first-year lagged 
number of cross-border M&As on acquirer’s productivity confirms this conjecture. In sensitivity 
tests (results available from the author), instead of using the two-year, three-year, and four-year 
lagged number of cross-border M&As, I also estimated the model using five-year and above lags 
and found that results substantively identical to that of the three year lags, meaning that the 
learning is completely assimilated after year five and beyond following the cross-border M&As. 
The use of lagged number of cross-border M&As enables us to examine the time pattern of the 
impact of cross-border M&As on acquirer’s productivity. For instance, if a cross-border M&A 
contributes to acquirer’s domestic productivity for the first 2 years but thereafter leads to no 
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further productivity gains, the 1- and 2-year lagged acquisition variables will be positive and 
significant, while the 3- and 4-year lagged acquisition variables will be non-significant.  
Fixed effect estimation with robust errors is first employed. Results from fixed effect 
estimations are displayed in model 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), 4(a), and 5(a) in Table 4.6. However, since 
the fixed effect model could result in inconsistent coefficient estimates with the presence of 
serial correlation in the error term, Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation (GMM 
estimation with robust errors) is then employed for estimation adjustment and robustness check. 
This GMM estimation is designed for datasets with many panels and few periods. It first 
differences the model to exclude the fixed effects. Then it uses instruments to address the 
potential endogeneity issues arising from the lagged dependent variable being the explanatory 
variables. Thus it is consistent and more asymptotically efficient than the fixed effect estimation. 
Results of the GMM estimation are consistent with those in the fixed effect estimation (shown in 
model 1(b), 2(b), 3(b), 4(b), and 5(b)). Further the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation 
indicates there is no autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. And the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions suggests that there is no overidentification problem in the GMM 
estimation.  
I first examine the effect of individual corporate governance variable in model 1. Then I 
include the interaction variables additively in model 2-5. Model 5 represents the full model with 
all interaction variable nested in a single regression. In Table 4.6, Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 
denotes the sum of yearly M&As in the prior two to four years. Similarly, SOE_2-4, TMT 
pay_2-4, Chairman Education Degree_2-4, and TMT Share Percentage_2-4 represents the 
average of state majority ownership, the average of top three executives’ pay, the average of 
chairman education degree, and the average of TMT equity ownership in the prior two to four 
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years. Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4), Sum(international Alliance_2-4), and Sum(Domestic 
M&A_2-4) denote the sum of yearly domestic M&As, international alliances, and domestic 
alliances respectively in the prior two to four years. Result in model 1 shows that the sum of 
cross-border M&As in the prior two to four years is significantly and positively related to 
acquirer’s domestic productivity. And chairman education contributes to acquirer’s domestic 
productivity. When adding SOE interaction in model 2, we can see that SOE negatively affect 
the relationship between cross-border M&As and acquirer’s domestic productivity. That is, state-
owned acquirers tend to underperform non-state-owned acquirers in terms of learning via cross-
border M&As. Further, the coefficients of SOE (0.113) and SOE*Cross-border M&A interaction 
(-0.112) in Model 2(a) suggests that almost all learning via cross-border M&As happens in the 
non-SOE acquirers but not the SOE acquirers
21
. Result in model 3 suggests that TMT pay does 
not matter for acquirer’s learning via cross-border M&As. It implies that the problem of 
misalignment between TMT pay and firm performance may indeed exist in Chinese corporate 
governance. High TMT pay could create wrong management incentives. It may result in 
management slack and shirking problems as managers feel secured with sufficient monetary 
earning. In light of another fact that managers may choose to pursue higher political or social 
status instead of the monetary satisfaction, the cash rewards may not take effect in incentivizing 
managers. Rather, TMT income and welfare may depend on their political connections or 
“guanxi” with the government official. A closer tie between TMT pay and performance may 
necessitate the existence of other factors. As suggested by Carpenter and Sanders (2002), firm 
performance may benefit due to agency issues when TMT pay reflects shareholder interests and 
key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In many Chinese firms, especially in 
SOEs, TMT pay is relatively “fixed” with large portion of annual salary based on hierarchies and 
                                                 
21 Estimated coefficient for the SOE acquirers equals to 0.113-0.112=0.0010. 
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relatively small portion of bonus and subsidy that may or may not be based on firm performance. 
It may depend not on marginal productivity but instead upon relative hierarchical differences 
between the individuals (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Sometimes “guanxi” can even influence the 
relative pay gap in a firm. In terms of the effect of chairman education, model 4 shows that 
chairman education negatively impact the relationship between cross-border M&As and acquirer 
subsequent domestic productivity. It suggests that the higher education in China may not be 
efficient enough in terms of cultivating students’ intellectual wisdom and enhance their learning 
capabilities to deal with practical problems. Another possible explanation is that the chairman 
with a lower education degree may have accumulated more years of practical working 
experiences in firm management and have developed stronger relationship (or “guanxi”) with 
both domestic and international market players compared to those with higher education degree. 
The experiences and relationship ‘assets’ of these chairmen enable them to be more 
entrepreneurial in dealing with the complexity and emergency associated with cross-border 
M&As than others. Thus the ‘liabilities’ resulting from their lack of academic education becomes 
less important in the Chinese context. The full model 5 with all nested interaction variables 
confirms the above findings. It further shows that higher TMT Share Percentage leads to 
acquirer’s better learning via cross-border M&As, suggesting that high TMT equity ownership 
helps incentivize the management group to devote themselves in the cross-border M&A 
activities and improve domestic productivity subsequently. That is, the TMT equity ownership 
helps to mitigate agency problems in China. The above findings are robust across fixed effect 
estimation and Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation. They are also consistent 
across the additive interaction model 2-4.  
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In sum, the empirical results suggest: (1) State ownership lowers the effect of cross-
border M&As on domestic productivity as compared to non-state ownership, which indicates 
that state-owned enterprises are indeed less efficient in terms of learning. Therefore H1 is 
supported. (2) Regarding management incentive mechanisms, top management team equity 
ownership enhances acquirer’s domestic productivity via cross-border M&As, whereas TMT pay 
does not. Therefore H2(b) is supported but not H2(a).  (3) Chairman’s education degree 
negatively affects the domestic productivity via cross-border M&As. Therefore I find reverse 
effect holds true for H3.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This essay examines the contingent factors on acquirers’ corporate governance that are 
conducive to emerging-market acquirers’ being able to learn from cross-border M&A activities. 
In sum, it concludes that: (1) Government ownership negatively affect the relationship of cross-
border M&As on subsequent domestic productivity, which indicates that state-owned enterprises 
are indeed less efficient in terms of learning; (2) TMT equity ownership enhances acquirer’s 
domestic productivity via cross-border M&As, whereas pay does not. It implies that stock 
rewards are more efficient than cash rewards in incentivizing managers to align their interests 
with the firm and alleviating the agency problem; (3) Chairman’s education degree negatively 
affects the learning via cross-border M&As. These findings suggest that existing literature needs 
to be enriched to incorporate the distinct attributes of emerging-market corporate governance. 
These results suggest that the corporate governance in emerging-markets shares some 
common attributes with the western enterprises after the modern enterprise reform, i.e., the 
equity ownership takes effect in incentivizing the TMT. However, as it is still transitioning from 
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the old government-controlled structure to the modern corporate system, it inevitably 
demonstrates some characteristics inherit from the old system, such as that government 
ownership still shows its inefficiency in terms of firm’s learning and capability development. 
Also, some of the controversial findings might be due to China’s special national and contextual 
characters, which may not be apply to developed nation or other emerging-markets. For example, 
the null effect of TMT pay and negative effect of chairman education on acquirer’s learning 
might result from China’s underdevelopment of the TMT pay mechanism and higher education 
system as compared to developed nations. Therefore, existing research needs to be enriched to 
enhance our understanding towards emerging-market’s corporate governance and its impact on 
firm- or national-level economic behaviors.  
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TABLES 
Table 4.1. Chinese Acquirer Government Ownership, 2000-2010. 
Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
SOE 
Non-SOE 
76 90 119 124 123 113 113 98 82 64 49 
99 108 93 102 103 97 151 167 170 104 106 
Total Acquirers 175 198 212 226 226 210 264 265 252 168 155 
SOE/Total Acquirers 0.434 0.455 0.561 0.549 0.544 0.538 0.428 0.37 0.325 0.381 0.316 
 
 
Table 4.2. Chinese Acquirer TMT Share Percentage, 2000-2010. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TMT Share (%) 0.148 0.054 0.335 3.312 4.613 2.310 7.076 6.671 5.439 10.525 11.789 
 
 
Table 4.3. Chinese Acquirer Chairman Education, 2000-2010. 
Year   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bachelor Below 8 9 11 16 21 22 22 22 22 23 22 
Bachelor and Above 47 66 88 113 144 157 162 184 197 200 204 
Total   55 75 99 129 165 179 184 206 219 223 226 
Ratio 0.855 0.880 0.889 0.876 0.873 0.877 0.880 0.893 0.900 0.897 0.903 
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Table 4.4. Variable Description. 
  Variable Name Measurement 
Dependent 
Variable 
LnSale Log of Chinese acquirer’s domestic sales 
Independent 
Variables 
CrossBorderM&A Number of yearly cross-border M&As  
SOE If government has over 50% of firm total shares 
TMT Share Percentage Ratio of TMT shares over firm total shares 
TMT Pay Log of the sum of top three executive pay 
Chairman Education 
Degree 
If chairman education degree is above Bachelor 
InternationalAlliance Number of yearly international alliances 
DomesticM&A Number of yearly domestic M&As 
DomesticAlliance Number of yearly domestic alliances 
LnLabor 
Log of Chinese acquirer’s number of domestic 
employees 
LnCapital Log of Chinese acquirer’s capital 
LnMaterial Log of Chinese acquirer’s raw materials 
LnSale_lagk Lagged lnSale in year (t-k) 
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Table 4.5. Summary Statistics: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations. 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.LnSale 21.318 1.679 1.000 
           2.LnCapital 8.081 1.418 0.880* 1.000 
          3.LnEmployee 8.680 1.489 0.618* 0.596* 1.000 
         4.LnMaterial 4.453 2.024 0.690* 0.662* 0.581* 1.000 
        5.Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 0.340 0.962 0.195* 0.181* 0.159* 0.118* 1.000 
       6.SOE_2-4 0.504 0.469 0.216* 0.262* 0.168* 0.154* 0.041 1.000 
      7.TMT Pay_2-4 13.484 0.758 0.451* 0.439* 0.264* 0.230* 0.043 0.002 1.000 
     8.Chairman Education Degree_2-4 0.888 0.304 0.042 -0.012 -0.016 0.018 -0.011 -0.029 0.051 1.000 
    9.TMT Share Percentage_2-4 0.020 0.159 0.009 -0.001 -0.026 0.010 0.006 -0.088* 0.006 -0.057* 1.000 
   10.Sum(International Alliance_2-4) 0.270 0.854 0.271* 0.266* 0.236* 0.214* 0.096* 0.035 0.261* -0.021 0.016 1.000 
  11.Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4) 0.653 1.692 0.303* 0.334* 0.240* 0.198* 0.158* 0.104* 0.158* 0.023 -0.015 0.089* 1.000 
 12.Sum(Domestic Alliance_2-4) 0.076 0.375 0.253* 0.308* 0.225* 0.171* 0.136* 0.108* 0.148* 0.021 -0.019 0.097* 0.206* 1 
 
Significance at * p < 0.10 
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Table 4.6. Effect of Corporate Governance on Chinese Acquirer’s Learning via Cross-Border M&As. 
 
Model 1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b) 3(a) 3(b) 4(a) 4(b) 5(a) 5(b) 
EV 
Add Corporate 
Governance Variables 
Add Government 
Ownership Interaction 
Add TMT Salary 
Interaction 
Add Chairman 
Education Degree 
Interaction 
Add TMT Share % 
Interaction (Full Model) 
DV: LnSale 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Individual Variable Effect           
LnCapital 0.440*** 0.408*** 0.457*** 0.422*** 0.460*** 0.434*** 0.451*** 0.422*** 0.485*** 0.469*** 
 
(0.147) (0.137) (0.143) (0.133) (0.157) (0.153) (0.151) (0.148) (0.164) (0.156) 
LnEmployee 0.059 0.055 0.049 0.047 0.049 0.047 0.042 0.040 0.044 0.046 
 
(0.057) (0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) 
LnMaterial 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.062 0.064 0.062 0.094 0.091 0.097 0.094 
 
(0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.060) 
Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 0.075* 0.082** 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.041 -0.033 0.259 0.179 1.413** 1.619** 
 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.434) (0.465) (0.454) (0.477) (0.669) (0.806) 
SOE_2-4 0.034 0.035 0.113 0.110 0.112 0.110 0.153 0.152 0.138 0.160 
 
(0.104) (0.097) (0.118) (0.111) (0.118) (0.112) (0.120) (0.113) (0.115) (0.113) 
TMT Pay_2-4 -0.048 -0.042 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.028 -0.026 -0.068 -0.075 
 
(0.088) (0.086) (0.089) (0.084) (0.090) (0.086) (0.088) (0.083) (0.084) (0.081) 
Chairman Education Degree_2-4 0.927*** 0.948*** 0.871*** 0.896*** 0.872*** 0.891*** 0.902*** 0.923*** 0.898*** 0.894*** 
 
(0.186) (0.201) (0.180) (0.200) (0.181) (0.192) (0.191) (0.200) (0.187) (0.191) 
TMT Share Percentage_2-4 0.335 0.325 0.333 0.327 0.313 0.287 0.453 0.427 0.321 0.323 
 
(0.359) (0.357) (0.297) (0.305) (0.306) (0.315) (0.360) (0.363) (0.268) (0.268) 
Interaction Effect           
SOE_2-4* 
Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 
  
-0.112** -0.101* -0.112** -0.103** -0.115** -0.105** -0.087* -0.086** 
  
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) 
TMT Pay_2-4* 
Sum(Cross-border M&A_2-4) 
    
0.005 0.011 0.007 0.013 -0.078 -0.093 
    
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.048) (0.058) 
Chairman Education Degree_2-
4* 
Cross-border M&A_2-4 
      
-0.286*** -0.287*** -0.341*** -0.353*** 
      
(0.067) (0.067) (0.083) (0.085) 
TMT Share Percentage_2-4* 
Cross-border M&A_2-4 
        
0.972* 1.132** 
        
(0.555) (0.573) 
 
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
           
 101 
 
 
Table 4.6. (cont.) 
Model 1(a) 1(b) 2(a) 2(b) 3(a) 3(b) 4(a) 4(b) 5(a) 5(b) 
EV 
Add Corporate 
Governance Variables 
Add Government 
Ownership Interaction 
Add TMT Salary 
Interaction 
Add Chairman 
Education Degree 
Interaction 
Add TMT Share % 
Interaction (Full Model) 
DV: LnSale 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Fixed 
Effect 
GMM 
Sum(international  Alliance_2-4) -0.012 -0.025 -0.015 -0.031 -0.015 -0.033 -0.010 -0.029 -0.028 -0.066 
 
(0.046) (0.064) (0.047) (0.065) (0.049) (0.066) (0.047) (0.062) (0.048) (0.061) 
Sum(Domestic M&A_2-4) -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.009** -0.010** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Sum(Domestic Alliance_2-4) -0.016 -0.009 -0.033 -0.021 -0.032 -0.020 -0.052 -0.039 -0.068 -0.051 
 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.043) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046) 
LnSale_Lag1 0.031 0.124 0.015 0.105 0.016 0.089 0.016 0.095 -0.002 0.003 
 
(0.061) (0.126) (0.067) (0.115) (0.066) (0.095) (0.063) (0.095) (0.065) (0.099) 
LnSale_Lag2 -0.093* -0.114 -0.091* -0.111 -0.092* -0.107* -0.092* -0.109* -0.087* -0.084 
 
(0.050) (0.074) (0.050) (0.070) (0.051) (0.064) (0.051) (0.063) (0.049) (0.059) 
LnSale_Lag3 0.093 0.095 0.053 0.061 0.052 0.057 0.030 0.037 0.000 0.008 
 
(0.087) (0.090) (0.081) (0.082) (0.085) (0.087) (0.083) (0.085) (0.089) (0.086) 
Constant 16.54*** 15.09*** 17.16*** 15.74*** 17.14*** 15.99*** 17.71*** 16.51*** 18.84*** 18.88*** 
 
(2.289) (2.836) (2.147) (2.559) (2.160) (2.472) (2.185) (2.491) (2.309) (2.809) 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effect  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 254 96 254 96 254 96 254 96 254 96 
R2 0.762 
 
0.770 
 
0.770 
 
0.786 
 
0.792 
 
 
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Significance at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding towards outward cross-border 
M&A activities by emerging-market MNEs, especially the distinct patterns (such as the 
involvement of government ownership, the learning objective via cross-border M&As, and their 
transitioning corporate governance practice) that are divergent from the traditional models based 
on evidence from developed nations. Many emerging-market firms went abroad and cross-border 
M&A represents the preferred entry mode as compared to greenfield investments and strategic 
alliances. SOEs – the enterprises seemingly most influenced by government policy – represent 
the very significant source of emerging-market MNEs’ cross-border M&As. The three essays 
above have reached interesting findings which contribute to the existing literature of firm’s 
international strategy and management. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the main findings. 
While MNEs from emerging-markets – and China in particular – tend to generate high 
acquisition premiums when they engage in cross-border merger activity, the determinants of this 
overbidding are not completely understood. Essay 1 posit that state-ownership is a key factor in 
explaining the high acquisition premiums generally paid by Chinese firms engaging in outward 
cross-border merger activities. Empirical results based on 450 Chinese outward cross-border 
M&As over 1990 to 2011 verify this relationship. Due to national welfare considerations and a 
soft-budget constraint, Chinese state-owned acquirers are able to pay higher acquisition 
premiums. Moreover, the inherent agency problems involved with Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (i.e., the improper-situated incentive of government nominated mangers and their 
lack of specialty in firm operations) and the information asymmetry problems manifesting in the 
context of cross-border activities may lead to biased evaluation of the target’s true value. Hence, 
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Chinese state-owned acquirers tend to pay higher acquisition premiums as compared to non-
state-owned-acquirers. Furthermore, when the acquirer’s ultimate parent is state-owned and the 
acquirer is private-owned, acquirers tend to pay an even higher acquisition premium as compared 
to cross-border acquisitions where both the acquirer and parent share a common ownership 
structure. 
Scholars have pointed out that cross-border M&As by emerging-market multinationals 
might represent a strategic move to learn from abroad and develop international competitiveness. 
However, it is not clear that emerging-market MNEs can achieve this strategy due to emerging-
market acquirers’ competitive disadvantage in advanced knowledge knowhow and the 
complexities involved with M&As in various international settings. Building on the perspective 
of asset exploration and exploitation (March, 1991), absorptive capacity theory (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990), and the knowledge of multinationals (Kogut & Zander, 1993), Essay 2 submits 
that emerging-market acquirers learn from foreign targets subsequent to cross-border M&A 
activities. They are able to assimilate this learning back home in order to upgrade their domestic 
productivity and compete more effectively at home. Based on data of 578 cross-border M&As by 
266 Chinese acquirers over 2000-2011, I find that: (1) Cross-border M&A activities in the prior 
two to four years are positively related to the Chinese acquirer’s domestic total factor 
productivity. (2) This home productivity increase stems from acquiring developed-nation targets 
as opposed to developing-nation targets. (3) Cross-border M&As are superior vehicles to engage 
in learning as compared to international alliances. These findings suggest that Chinese acquirers 
are able to learn and enhance their capabilities via accelerated internationalization. Therefore, the 
Chinese governments’ ‘Go Global’ policy has been generally successful. 
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Corporate governance plays an important role in firm development especially in the 
context of emerging-markets where their economy is constantly in transition and characterized 
with unique complexity. Therefore Essay 3 examines how emerging-market acquirer’s 
heterogeneity in corporate governance may possibly affect acquirer’s learning via cross-border 
M&As. Based on data of 578 cross-border M&As by 266 Chinese acquirers over 2000-2011, I 
find that: (1) Government ownership decreases the effect of cross-border M&As on domestic 
productivity upgrading in subsequent years, which indicates that state-owned enterprises are 
indeed less efficient in terms of learning; (2) Regarding management incentive mechanisms, top 
management team equity ownership enhances acquirer’s domestic productivity via cross-border 
M&A activities, whereas pay does not. It implies that stock rewards are more efficient than cash 
rewards in incentivizing managers to align their interests with the firm and thus alleviating 
agency problems. (3) Counterintuitively, chairman’s education level negatively affects acquirer’s 
being able to learn via cross-border M&A activities. These findings suggest that existing 
literature needs to be enriched to incorporate the unique attributes of emerging-market corporate 
governance. 
 
LIMITATIONS  
While this dissertation submits that one often-stated motive behind emerging-market MNEs’ 
cross-border M&As is to learn via the strategic assets acquired from targets overseas, I did not 
exactly examine the motive of these emerging-market acquirers. Data employed in this 
dissertation is secondary in nature.  Thus I was not able to directly capture acquirers’ motivation. 
In line with many other studies on learning and knowledge transfer (e.g., Bertrand & Capron, 
1994; Kogut & Zander, 1993, etc.), I use empirical analysis instead to infer potential learning 
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involved in emerging-market MNEs’ cross-border M&A activities. Future studies may employ 
an interview or survey method to examine acquirers’ motives behind cross-border M&A 
activities.  
Another limitation is that this dissertation is based on single-country evidence and thus 
findings here may not be generalizable to other emerging-market nations. One of the difficulties 
in International Business studies arises from various national, political and societal contexts 
embedded in international settings. These various contexts could be the sources of differences in 
cross-border business activities and are of varying importance for different elements of 
organizational structure and process (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Accordingly, they can be 
contingent variables explaining the heterogeneity in outward cross-border M&A activities by 
different emerging-market nations. Future research may consider a comparative study across 
emerging-market nations to examine the various national, political and societal contingencies on 
the relationships identified in this dissertation. Needless to say, this dissertation still provides 
valuable analysis and draw important conclusions by studying the world largest emerging-market 
nation, China. 
In Essay 1 I controlled for several characters of foreign targets to exclude the effect of 
target quality on acquisitions premiums such as target strategic industry, national location (fixed 
effect), and accounting measurement (book value, market-to-book ratio, assets, etc.). However, I 
was not able to capture some intangible assets of foreign targets like R&D investments, patents, 
brands, etc. Inclusion of these variables may better control for targets’ true value in order to 
analyze the effect of government ownership on acquisition premium.  
Essay 2 concludes that on average Chinese acquirers are able to learn via cross-border 
M&A activities. However, I didn’t examine the contingencies affecting the level of learning in 
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essay 2. (i.e., what factors may potentially increase/decrease the learning effectiveness 
subsequent to cross-border M&As?). Future may consider contingent variables such as 
management integration between the acquirer and the target, knowledge transfer from the target 
to the acquirer, and whether the acquirer keeps the target management after the M&A 
announcement, etc. These could be interesting contingent variables to enrich the current findings 
in follow-on studies.   
For H2(b) in Essay 3 regarding the impact of TMT pay on acquirer’s learning 
effectiveness subsequent to the cross-border M&As, potentially there exists conflicting rationales 
omitted in the hypothesis development which result in the insignificant empirical finding. One 
such rationale could be that high TMT pay may actually lead to manager’s incentive 
misalignment with shareholders’ interests which aggravate the agency problems. Further study 
may employ a competing hypothesis in explaining the effect of TMT pay on firm’s learning 
effectiveness/performance.  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation advances extant literature in International Strategy and Management by 
showing that the patterns of emerging-market outward investments are shaped by their distinct 
attributes such as the involvement of government ownership, the learning objective via cross-
border M&A activities, and their transitioning corporate governance practice. This study of these 
distinct patterns enriches the traditional explanations on cross-border M&As based on 
developed-nation MNEs. For example, the important findings with regard to government 
ownership on cross-border M&As suggest that government in emerging-market nations 
nowadays is not simply a policy maker or a political entity behind firms’ economic activities. It 
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is increasingly stepping out from the domestic domain into the global business as an active 
player and it is reshaping current international investments and production layout in many ways. 
Moreover, in contrast to the incremental expansion predicted by internationalization process 
theory (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), this dissertation shows that emerging-market MNEs can be 
successful via accelerated internationalization with serials of risky, aggressive, and high-profile 
cross-border M&As. In addition, existing studies based on evidence from developed-nation 
acquirers typically consider the acquirer to be superior to the target in terms of knowledge and 
capabilities. Thus when conducting cross-border M&As, advanced knowledge tends to flow 
from the acquirer (or the home nation) to the foreign target (or the host nation). Accordingly, 
earlier studies focus on learning or knowledge diffusion that happened in the host nation. In 
contrast, an important conclusion reached in this dissertation is that learning via cross-border 
M&As by emerging-market MNEs happened in acquirers’ home nation as the domestic market 
still represents their primary territory of operation and a major battlefield against global 
competitors. Therefore emerging-market acquirers’ tend to transfer knowledge obtained from 
overseas back home in order to enhance their capabilities and skillset to survive and succeed in 
the domestic market. In line with the very limited empirical studies, theoretical development on 
emerging-market outward FDI is slow as current explanations tend to rely largely on the 
explanations drawn from existing internationalization models. Some scholars have argued that 
existing theories are quite adequate to explain emerging-market MNEs’ internationalization 
(Narula, 2006). However, this study suggests that traditional theories largely built on the 
evidence from developed nations may not be enough to explain the internationalization by 
emerging-market MNEs.  
 108 
 
SOEs, as the implementer of nation’s economic, social, and political missions, act a very 
important role in the process of emerging-market MNEs’ internationalization. On one hand, they 
enjoy the privileged access to capital and policy preference from the government so that they 
have strong “purchasing power” as compared to non-SOEs when conducting cross-border M&As. 
On the other, SOEs pay very high premiums to foreign targets and yet they do not outperform 
non-SOEs in terms of domestic productivity upgrading via cross-border M&As in spite of their 
privileges received from the government. It implies the inherent organizational inefficiency in 
SOEs and the potential waste of the government resources devoted to SOEs’ international 
activities. It may also suggests that SOEs also carry political objectives when conducting cross-
border M&A activities, which do not lead to effective learning and home productivity upgrading 
subsequent to cross-border M&A activities. In contrast, non-SOEs are economic entities which 
seek for profit maximization. Non-SOEs have a better governance mode in terms of learning 
effectiveness despite their lack of privileged access provided by the government. This study 
confirms that non-SOEs are more efficient than SOEs in organizational learning and they are the 
major force in achieving China’s “Go Global” policy. That is, emerging-market nations should 
continue their path towards the privatization of SOEs in order to bolster their economic and 
social development.  
Since China, together with other emerging-market nations, is now becoming the ‘world 
factory’ and it takes up an increasingly proportion of the world FDI, the change in its 
productivity and international activities have a profound influence on the world economy. Future 
studies should take the opportunity to enhance our understanding towards emerging-market 
MNEs’ internationalization. Not only will these studies contribute to the theoretical development 
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of International Strategy and Management, but also they will provide up-to-date insights and 
implications for practitioners and policy makers.  
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TABLES 
Table 5.1. Summary of Findings. 
Essay Research Question Main Findings 
Essay 1 – Do State-Owned Enterprises 
Pay More? Evidence from Chinese 
Outward Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions  
Does state-ownership of the acquirer 
lead to higher acquisition premium paid 
to the foreign target?  
 Chinese state-owned MNEs pay higher 
acquisition premiums than do non-state-owned 
MNEs. 
 State-owned MNEs pay even higher acquisition 
premiums when they act as parents and employ 
a privately-owned subsidiary to complete the 
cross-border M&As.  
Essay 2 – Emerging-Market Acquirers’ 
Productivity Gains via Cross-Border 
M&As: Evidence from Chinese 
Acquirers 
Do emerging-market acquirers upgrade 
their domestic productivity subsequent 
to the cross-border M&A activities?  
 Cross-border M&A activities in the prior two to 
four years are positively related to the Chinese 
acquirer’s domestic total factor productivity.  
 This home productivity increase stems from 
acquiring developed-nation targets as opposed 
to developing-nation targets.  
 Cross-border M&As are superior vehicles to 
engage in learning as compared to international 
alliances. 
Essay 3 – How Corporate Governance 
Affects Emerging-Market Acquirers’ 
Productivity Gains via Cross-Border 
M&As: Evidence from Chinese 
Acquirers  
How does emerging-market acquirer’s 
heterogeneity in corporate governance 
affect acquirer’s learning via cross-
border M&A activities?  
 Government ownership decreases the effect of 
cross-border M&As on subsequent domestic 
productivity as compared to non-government 
ownership, which indicates that state-owned 
enterprises are indeed less efficient in terms of 
learning. 
 Regarding TMT incentive mechanisms, TMT 
equity ownership enhances acquirer’s domestic 
productivity via cross-border M&As, whereas 
TMT pay does not.  
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